LIMITING THE PROPERTY CLAUSE
Jeffrey M. Schmitt
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Property Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate the public lands “without limitation.” This Article argues that the Court’s interpretation of the Property Clause
is inconsistent with constitutional history, antithetical to structure principles of
federalism, and undesirable from the standpoint of environmental law. When the
country originally debated the meaning of the Property Clause, the leading
statesmen of the early Republic rejected a broad interpretation of federal power.
They believed that, while Congress had a police power over the territories, it had
no more regulatory authority over federal land within a state by virtue of the
Property Clause than a private landowner. If the Court’s recent efforts to revive
federalism are to be meaningful, it should return to this original understanding.
Congress’s unlimited legislative power over federal lands enables it to overrule
state policy on many of the core issues of state concern that justify the existence
of federalism, including environmental law. Perhaps counterintuitively, reinvigorating federalism in this context would also structurally favor more robust environmental regulation. This is because, while the federal government would retain
the power to limit the use of its lands as a proprietor, the states would have the
power to go further as sovereign regulators. However, because the state’s regulatory power would not include the power to override federal property rights, the
states would not have the power to authorize any land use that would conflict
with federal rules. Unlike the current system of federal supremacy, a limited
reading of the Property Clause would thus structurally favor conservation over
development.
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INTRODUCTION
In spite of the principle that Congress is limited to its enumerated powers,
the federal government effectively has a police power over one-third of the
country. This power arises from the Property Clause of the Constitution, which
grants Congress the power to “make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States[.]”1 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Congress’s legislative authority under the
Property Clause is “without limitations.”2 This expansive power extends to 640
million acres of federal land, most of which is located in the West.3 Although
the Property Clause is generally ignored in the study of constitutional law,4 it is
1

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. This Clause is also known as the “Territories Clause.” Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 203 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Enclave Clause
further grants Congress a power of “exclusive [l]egislation” over federal land purchased with
the consent of a state. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. Although the Enclave Clause applies
to most federal buildings, military bases, and some national parks, the vast majority of federal land is governed exclusively by the Property Clause. See Charles F. Wilkinson, CrossJurisdictional Conflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State Interests on Federal and Indian
Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 145, 148–49, 152 (1982).
2 See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 535, 539 (1976).
3 See CAROL H. VINCENT ET AL., FEDERAL LAND OWNERSHIP: OVERVIEW AND DATA 1, 4, 6,
7, 21 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42346.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QGG-K74H]. The
United States owns and manages roughly 640 million acres of land. Id. at 1. This represents
approximately 61.3 percent of the land in Alaska and 46.4 percent of the land in eleven contiguous western states. Id. at 7, 20, 21. In fact, 79.6 percent of the land in Nevada is owned
by the United States. Id. at 7.
4 No leading textbook devotes a single case to the study of the Property Clause. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2017); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 742, 967–68, 1039 (7th ed. 2013).
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thus a significant source of federal authority. In fact, the federal government
uses its land ownership to justify overriding state policy on topics ranging from
wildlife management5 to the oversight of care for unaccompanied migrant children.6
This Article will argue that the Court’s expansive interpretation of the
Property Clause is inconsistent with constitutional history, antithetical to structure principles of federalism, and undesirable as a matter of policy. It therefore
will present a new approach to the Property Clause that both accommodates the
reality of widespread federal land ownership and imposes limits on federal regulatory power.7 Although legal history is at the core of this Article, its interpre-

5

See Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 532–34.
Federal authorities rejected state oversight of a facility in Homestead, Florida on the
grounds that it is located on federal land. See John Burnett, Inside the Largest and Most Controversial Shelter for Migrant Children in the U.S., NPR (Feb. 13, 2019), https://www.npr.
org/2019/02/13/694138106 [https://perma.cc/E4QC-EP66]. The federal government took the
same position with respect to a shelter located on federal land in Tornillo, Texas before its
recent closure. Pursuant to federal law, however, shelters for migrant children are typically
subject to state standards and inspections. See Graham Kates, Some Detention Centers for
Migrant Children not Subject to State Inspections, CBS NEWS (July 5, 2018),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/some-detention-centers-for-immigrant-children-wont-be-su
bject-to-traditional-inspections [https://perma.cc/R2X7-T5CE]. These particular facilities are
likely located on federal enclaves, but the Court’s modern Property Clause doctrine would
enable the federal government to exclude state oversight of migrant shelters on any federally
owned land. Id.
7 Most recent scholarship on the Property Clause has focused on the power of the United
States to own land within the states. See Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106
CALIF. 631, 684 (2018); Ian Bartrum, Searching for Cliven Bundy: The Constitution and
Public Lands, 2 NEV. L.J.F. 67, 72 (2018); John D. Leshy, Are U.S. Public Lands Unconstitutional?, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 553 (2018); Jeffery Schmitt, A Historical Reassessment of
Congress’s “Power to Dispose of” the Public Lands, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 453, 455
(2018). When scholars discuss Congress’s power to regulate activities on federal land, they
nearly always support the Court’s broad interpretation. See, e.g., Peter A. Appel, The Power
of Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private
Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15 (2001); Michael C. Blumm & Olivier Jamin, The Property
Clause and its Discontents: Lessons from the Malheur Occupation, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781,
801 (2016); Eugene R. Gaetke, Refuting the “Classic” Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 617, 620 (1985); Dale D. Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, 63
DENV. U. L. REV. 495, 498 (1986) hereinafter [Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property
Clause Doctrine]; Dale D. Goble, The Property Clause: As if Biodiversity Mattered, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1195, 1200–01 (2004) hereinafter [Goble, The Property Clause]; Nick Lawton, Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act: Demanding a Gift of Federal Lands, 16 VT. J.
ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (2014); Martin Nie et al., Fish and Wildlife Management on Federal Lands:
Debunking State Supremacy, 47 ENVTL L. 797, 819–20 (2017). Many other scholars discuss
the Court’s interpretation with approval. Ablavsky, supra, at 692; Jessica Owley, Taking the
Public Out of Public Lands: Shifts in Coal-Extraction Policies in the Trump Administration,
13 FIU L. REV. 35, 38 (2018). The few scholars who argue for a more limited reading of
Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause generally also contend that Congress
was historically understood to have had a constitutional duty to divest itself of the federal
land within the states. Albert W. Brodie, A Question of Enumerated Powers: Constitutional
Issues Surrounding Federal Ownership of the Public Lands, 12 PAC. L.J. 693, 703 (1981);
David E. Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283,
6
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tation of the Property Clause is based on several modalities of constitutional
argument, including text, original intent, history, precedent, structure, and policy, rather than any particular theory of constitutional interpretation.8 This approach represents a significant break from past scholarship, which has virtually
ignored constitutional history outside the founding period and Supreme Court
precedent.9 This Article is also the first to make the counter-intuitive claim that
limiting federal power under the Property Clause would create a system that
structurally favors conservation over the use and development of federal land.
In sum, this Article will argue that, while Congress should have a police
power over the federal territories, it should have no more regulatory authority
over federal land within a state by virtue of the Property Clause than a private
landowner. Under this approach, Congress could continue to limit activities on
federal lands, just as any landowner can exclude trespassers. When acting solely under the Property Clause, however, Congress would not have the ability to
preempt otherwise valid state regulations. Unless authorized pursuant to the
Commerce Clause or another enumerated power, activities on federal land
would therefore need to be consistent with both state and federal law. For example, even if the federal government used its power as a landowner to authorize a company to pollute on federal land, the state would have the power to
block such activities as a sovereign regulator.10 Unlike the Court’s modern doctrine, this approach to the Property Clause is faithful to constitutional history, is
consistent with the Court’s federalism revolution, and would structurally favor
environmental conservation.
This interpretation of the Property Clause is based on constitutional history. When the country first debated the meaning of the Property Clause, the
leading statesmen of the early Republic rejected expansive federal regulatory
power over the public lands within a state.11 After the first new states were admitted to the Union, westerners demanded that Congress cede title to all land
within each state’s borders. Failing to do so, these westerners contended, violated the fundamental constitutional requirement of equal state sovereignty.
Congressional leaders responded by arguing that the western states retained
equal political power because federal land ownership did not confer any greater
legislative authority on Congress than that of an ordinary proprietor. Continued
federal land ownership was therefore predicated on a limited understanding of
Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause. Although scholars
294 (1976); Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New
Federalism and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 FLA. L. REV. 557, 559 (1995).
8 For more on the standard forms of constitutional argument, see PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991). The author’s goal is to present an argument
that will be accepted by originalists and living constitutionalists alike. Id.
9 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. Professor Ablavsky is a notable exception. However, his article primarily discusses the nature of federal title to the land rather than Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause. See Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 635.
10 Because the federal government would be acting only as a landowner, it would lack the
power to preempt state law when acting solely under the Property Clause.
11
See Schmitt, supra note 7 at 475–78.
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have examined these congressional debates in other contexts,12 this Article is
the first to use them to interpret Congress’s powers under the Property Clause.
Placing the Supreme Court’s precedent within the context of these larger
and more publicly visible congressional debates helps to resolve a longstanding
scholarly dispute. The Court’s early cases did not directly rule on the scope of
Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause, and scholars have
parsed the Court’s dicta to reach dramatically different conclusions.13 Because
congressional leaders publicly endorsed a limited view of the Property Clause,
it is likely that the Court shared similar views. In fact, this Article will argue
that the Court did not clearly endorse a broad view of federal power until the
New Deal constitutional revolution of the early twentieth century.
Structural principles of federalism also support this Article’s interpretation.
The Property Clause is rarely invoked today because most federal legislation,
including environmental law, is justified under a broad reading of the Commerce Clause.14 If the Commerce Clause conferred unlimited power on Congress, the Court’s ahistorical reading of the Property Clause would be of no importance. Over the past several decades, however, the Court has begun to limit
congressional power to preserve a zone of autonomy for the states.15
The Court’s expansive reading of the Property Clause, however, empowers
Congress to sidestep these limitations on federal power and effectively overrule
state policy on many of the core social issues that justify the existence of federalism.16 By the same logic, if the Court were to reverse Roe v. Wade, and a state
criminalized abortion, Congress arguably could authorize the construction of
abortion clinics on federal land within each state. Congress also could legalize
gambling, drug use, physician-assisted suicide, and prostitution on federal
land.17 More realistically, the federal government could—and sometimes
does—overrule state efforts to protect wildlife, the environment, and natural
12

See, e.g., DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS xvi (1984); PAUL
W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 9 (1968); JOHN R. VAN ATTA,
SECURING THE WEST: POLITICS, PUBLIC LANDS, AND THE FATE OF THE OLD REPUBLIC 1785–
1850 6 (2014); RAYNOR G. WELLINGTON, Preface to THE POLITICAL AND SECTIONAL
INFLUENCE OF THE PUBLIC LANDS 1828–1842 (1914). These historical works are broadly
concerned with public land policy rather than the history of constitutional argument.
13 Compare Appel, supra note 7, at 30–36, Gaetke, supra note 7, at 639–45, and Goble, The
Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, supra note 7, at 502–11, with Brodie, supra
note 7, at 712–15, and Engdahl, supra note 7, at 358–62.
14 See Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1, 66 (2003); Owley, supra note 7, at 37.
15 See infra Section IV.A.
16 See generally supra text accompanying notes 5 & 6. In 2017, California passed legislation
directing the state attorney general to inspect detention facilities used to hold noncitizens for
purposes of immigration enforcement. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California denied the federal government’s motion to enjoin the law and held that the California attorney general is entitled to access. See United States v. California, No. 2:18-cv490-JAM-KJN, 2018 WL 3361055, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2018).
17 See Appel supra note 7, at 5 (raising similar hypotheticals and arguing that they should be
constitutional under the Property Clause).
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resources.18 Although Congress could directly achieve many of these same
goals today under the Commerce Clause and its other enumerated powers, the
Court’s broad reading of the Property Clause would undermine any future limitations it places on federal power.
In fact, limiting the Property Clause would have an immediate impact on
issues that cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause today. For example, suppose that a wetland located on U.S. land was wholly located within one
state and did not connect to any navigable water. Although the Clean Water Act
(CWA) prohibits the discharge of pollution into the “waters of the United
States,” the Commerce Clause does not justify application of the CWA to isolated wetlands that lack a nexus to navigable waters.19 If the federal government were to regulate the discharge of pollutants into this hypothetical wetland,
it would therefore be forced to rely on the Property Clause. Under the Court’s
current understanding of the Property Clause, federal authorization would
preempt any conflicting state law.20 If this Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause were adopted, however, the state could prohibit pollution of the
wetland notwithstanding any contrary federal authorization. The inverse,
though, would not hold. The federal government, like any other landowner,
would be able to prevent the discharge of pollutants on its lands even if the discharge would otherwise comply with state law. Like a one-way ratchet, limiting
the Property Clause would therefore merely provide an additional layer of protection for the environment. Although this example may seem inconsequential,
the importance of the Property Clause will grow if, and when, the Court narrows the reach of the federal commerce power.
This example also highlights why this Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause would enhance structural protections for the environment.21 Under
most environmental statutes, the states are permitted to go beyond federal protections.22 However, this is merely a matter of legislative grace. When such
18

See LARRY VOYLES ET AL., ASS’N FISH AND WILDLIFE AGENCIES, WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT
AUTHORITY: THE STATE AGENCIES’ PERSPECTIVE 2 (2014).
19 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722, 739, 742 (2006). Although Rapanos
technically dealt with the reach of the CWA, the Court’s interpretation of the statute was influenced by its understanding of the Commerce Clause. The “nexus” test is from Justice
Kennedy’s concurring opinion. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Because no single opinion obtained a majority of the Court, Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which is the narrowest, is
most likely controlling. See Robert W. Adler, US Environmental Protection Agency’s New
Waters of the United States Rule: Connecting Law and Science, 34 FRESHWATER SCI. 1595,
1598 (2015).
20 See California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 593 (1987).
21 This Article is the first to examine the practical consequences of a limited reading of the
Property Clause. However, there is a robust debate within the environmental law community
regarding the proper role of the states. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108, 110–12 (2005) (discussing the academic debate). This debate, however, is generally about which level of government should have the
primary regulatory role. Both sides acknowledge that the federal government has the constitutional power to displace state policy. Id. This Article differs by arguing for constitutional
limitations on federal power.
22
See id. at 126–27.
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laws are passed under the Commerce Clause, Congress always maintains the
power to overrule state policy. If Congress acted exclusively under this Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause, however, the states could regulate
harmful activities on federal land in the same manner as activities on private
land. Environmentally destructive land uses would thus be lawful only if authorized both by the federal government as a landowner and by the states as
sovereign regulators. In other words, rather than giving absolute power to the
federal government, each level of government would have the power to stop
activities on federal land that cause harm to the state’s environment. As recent
moves by the Trump Administration have made clear,23 federal supremacy is
not always synonymous with good policy or environmental protection.
The remainder of this Article is divided into five parts. Part I will review
the text of the Property Clause and intent of the framers. Part II will develop the
original understanding of the Clause through an analysis of several previously
overlooked congressional debates. Part III will examine Supreme Court precedent and argue that it supported a limited understanding of federal power under
the Property Clause until the New Deal Era. Part IV will argue that a limited
interpretation of the Clause is more consistent with the Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Part V will contend that this Article’s approach would provide
structural protections against undue environmental degradation.
I.

TEXT AND FRAMERS’ INTENT

Constitutional interpretation typically includes an analysis of the text, original intent, history, court precedent, and practical policy implications.24 The
text and structure of the Constitution, however, do not resolve the issue of
whether the Property Clause grants Congress an unlimited power to regulate
federal land within the states. Moreover, because the federal government did
not own a significant amount of land within the states at the time of the Founding,25 there is little evidence of original intent.
A. The Text and Structure of the Constitution
The Property Clause of Article IV states: “[t]he Congress shall have Power
to dispose of and make all needful [r]ules and [r]egulations respecting the
[t]erritory or other [p]roperty belonging to the United States[.]”26 Samuel John23

The Trump Administration has recently proposed weakening regulations under both the
Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water Act. See Coral Davenport, Trump Rule Would
Limit E.P.A.’s Control Over Water Pollution, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/12/06/climate/trump-water-pollution-wotus-replacement.html
[https://perma.cc/L4KM-RDLN]; Michael Doyle, E&E News, Trump Overhaul of Endangered Species Act Could Shrink Protections for Many Animals, SCI. MAG. (July 19, 2018),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/07/trump-administration-proposes-endangered-spec
ies-act-overhaul-could-shrink-critical [https://perma.cc/998J-MCKJ].
24 See BOBBITT, supra note 8.
25 See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 464.
26
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
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son’s A Dictionary of the English Language, which is generally seen as the
most authoritative founding era dictionary,27 defines “Territory” as “[l]and;
country; dominion; district” and “Property” as a “[p]ossession held in one’s
own right.”28 Giving the text its ordinary meaning, a reader in the late eighteenth century therefore would likely have understood that Congress had the
power to regulate federal land.
The key textual issue is whether the Supremacy Clause gives preemptive
effect to such “[r]egulations.” The Supremacy Clause provides that the “Constitution, and the [l]aws of the United States which shall be made in [p]ursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and . . . any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary notwithstanding.”29 A plain
reading of the Property Clause in light of the Supremacy Clause supports the
modern doctrine. If the Supremacy Clause applies to all federal land policy, it
would be supreme over any conflicting state law.
A more limited reading of the text, however, is also possible. The Enclave
Clause grants Congress the power to “exercise exclusive [l]egislation” over the
District of Columbia and “all [p]laces purchased by the [c]onsent of the
[l]egislature of the [s]tate in which the [s]ame shall be, for the [e]rection of
[f]orts, [m]agazines, [a]rsenals, dock-[y]ards, and other needful [b]uildings.”30
Congress’s power of “exclusive legislation” over federal enclaves31 appears to
be more robust than the Property Clause’s power to make “needful [r]ules and
[r]egulations.”32 Anyone reading these provisions in context at the time of the
founding (or today) would assume that Congress’s power to exercise “exclusive
Legislation” over federal enclaves was more robust than its power to make
“needful Rules and Regulations” under the Property Clause. As demonstrated
below, however, Congress has always exercised an unlimited and exclusive police power over the territories prior to statehood. Any limitations on federal
regulatory power under the Property Clause therefore must apply only to federal land within an existing state.
Although the Property Clause does not explicitly distinguish between federal land within a territory and a state,33 such a distinction is consistent with the
27

See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to
Determine the Original Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 359
(2014).
28 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE WORDS ARE
DEDUCED FROM THEIR ORIGINALS, EXPLAINED IN THEIR DIFFERENT MEANINGS, AND
AUTHORIZED BY THE NAMES OF THE WRITERS IN WHOLE WORKS THEY ARE FOUND (10th ed.
1792).
29 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
30 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
31 Id.
32 Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
33 In contrast, some scholars who advance a broad reading of the Property Clause contend
that, because the Clause does not distinguish between “[p]roperty” within a state and
“[t]erritory” outside of a state, Congress’s power over federal property must be the same in
scope as its power over the territories. Appel, for example, does little to distinguish state-
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text. The Clause grants Congress the power to pass only such “[r]ules and
[r]egulations” that are “needful.”34 The scope of the “[r]ules and [r]egulations”
that are needful for a territory may be significantly more expansive than those
that are needful for federal land within an existing state. The Northwest Ordinance, for example, provided for the disposition of an estate at the death of the
owner,35 but such a regulation would be unnecessary after statehood due to
state intestate law.
Modern doctrine on implied powers supports this more limited reading of
the text. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall explicitly equates
Congress’s power to pass “needful” regulations for the territories with the Necessary and Proper Clause.36 And, in NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts
states that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not authorize regulations that
“undermine the structure of government established by the Constitution.”37 In
other words, he explained, laws that are “not consist[ent] with the letter and
spirit of the constitution, . . . are not proper [means] for carrying into Execution
Congress’s enumerated powers.”38
Although Congress has not yet tried to push the boundaries of its regulatory powers under the Property Clause, the Court’s unlimited interpretation of the
Property Clause arguably authorizes legislation that would be inconsistent with
the spirit and structure of the Constitution. As the Tenth Amendment makes
clear, federal power is limited so as to preserve the sovereignty of the states.39
The Enclave Clause protects state sovereignty by imposing a requirement that
the states consent before Congress is empowered to displace state power over
its territory.40 Allowing Congress to bypass this requirement by having preemptive authority over all federal land without state consent thus arguably undermines structural protections for state sovereignty and federalism.
Moreover, as a textual matter, because the Enclave Clause clearly authorizes federal control over land within the states, it could be argued that its requirements must be met before Congress’s “regulations” have preemptive effect over state law. Several canons of construction support this more limited
reading of the Property Clause. Under the canon of generalia specialibus non

ments, cases, and historical examples involving property within a state from territories. See
Appel, supra note 7 at 65.
34 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
35 See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE
63 (1987).
36 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 382 (1819).
37 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 559 (2012) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
38 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
39 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
40 The Enclave Clause is also limited to the seat of government and “needful Buildings.”
Despite this textual limitation, however, the Supreme Court has held that national parks can
be federal enclaves. See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 152–53.
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derogant, a specific provision prevails over a general provision.41 While the
Property Clause generally applies to all federal property, including federal territory outside the states and chattels, the Enclave Clause applies more specifically to federal land within the existing states.42 It is also a familiar canon that the
text should be interpreted to give effect to every word so as to avoid surplusage.43 Because a broad reading of the Property Clause grants Congress an unlimited power to regulate federal land within the states, it renders the Enclave
Clause meaningless.44 Reading the Property Clause in light of the Enclave
Clause thus supports limiting Congress’s power to enact preemptive
“[r]egulations” to territories outside existing states.
In sum, the Property Clause, when read in context, could be read to grant
Congress either: (1) an unlimited regulatory power over federal land, or (2) a
more limited regulatory power that does not include the power to preempt contrary state legislation with respect to land within a state. Because the text is not
dispositive, constitutional interpretation must turn to other sources, such as
original intent, constitutional history, and court precedent.
B. Original Intent
Original intent also does little to clarify the meaning of the Property
Clause. There is simply no record of the Founders discussing the power of
Congress to regulate federal land within an existing state. In fact, the records of
the Constitutional Convention contain little debate over any aspect of the Property Clause. On August 18, 1787, a proposal was referred to the committee of
detail to grant Congress the powers “[t]o dispose of the unappropriated lands of

41

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993 Term Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 99 (1994) (collecting common canons of
interpretation in an appendix).
42 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
43 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court’s Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2235 (1996).
44 Goble rejects this argument by arguing that “[i]t is at least equally logical to read the article I clause as completely displacing state law by its own force, while the article IV clause is
preemptive only to the extent that state law is inconsistent with congressional legislation.”
Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, supra note 7, at 501. Although
Goble’s reading is logically possible, it is not a natural reading of the text. The Property and
Enclave Clauses use dramatically different language, and Goble’s interpretation would render the distinction almost meaningless. Under Goble’s reading, Congress could use its Property Clause powers to immediately displace all state law, and it could use its Enclave powers
to announce that state law will apply. Goble’s distinction also does not address the obvious
federalism concerns animating the requirement that the states consent to federal enclaves.
Finally, the Court has never accepted this distinction, as state law that existed at the time of
the cession presumptively applies even in federal enclaves, other than D.C. See Engdahl, supra note 7, at 333–35. The state may also qualify its consent to the enclave and retain jurisdiction over certain matters. See James L. Buchwalter, Construction and Application of Federal Enclave Clause (U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8 cl. 17), 21 A.L.R. FED. 3d Art. 6, § 2 (2017).
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the United States.”45 Gouverneur Morris later proposed language that would
become the modern Property Clause, which was adopted with no debate.46
Perhaps the most that can be said of the Founders’ intent is that they
thought the Property Clause authorized Congress to reenact the Northwest Ordinance and pass similar legislation. In Federalist 38, Madison pointed out that
the Confederation Congress had created territorial governments and disposed of
the federal lands “without the least colour [sic] of constitutional authority.”47
Madison, however, did not mean this as a criticism of Congress, because it
“could not have done otherwise.”48 Instead, the Confederation Congress’s lack
of authority to pass the Northwest Ordinance was “an alarming proof of the
danger resulting from a government, which does not possess regular powers
commensurate to its objects[.]”49 In Federalist 7, Alexander Hamilton likewise
stressed the danger posed by territorial disputes between the states without federal control over the public lands and pointed out that revenue from land sales
could be used to retire the war debt.50
The framers therefore sought to facilitate the continuation of the federal
land policy that had existed under the Articles of Confederation. Three relevant
principles governed this policy: (1) the federal government would have an unlimited regulatory power over the federal territories (outside the borders of any
state), (2) the new states would be equal in sovereignty to the old, and (3) the
United States would retain land within the new western states.
First, the federal government would have absolute regulatory power over
the territories. Unorganized settlement of the western territories could provoke
conflict with Native Americans, isolate western communities, and undermine
the value of prime lands that could be sold to pay down the national debt.51 As
Madison also noted in The Federalist, “[t]he Confederation Congress therefore
passed several ordinances regulating the territories, even though it lacked any
authority to do so in the Articles of Confederation.”52 The Northwest Ordinance, for example, both provided a plan for government of the territories and
directly legislated on matters such as contract rights, civil liberties, and slavery.53

45

2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
Id. at 466.
47 THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, at 193 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan
eds., 2001).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001).
51 See Andrew R.L. Cayton, Radicals in the “Western World”: The Federalist Conquest of
Trans-Appalachian North America, in FEDERALISTS RECONSIDERED 77, 81–82 (Doron BenAtar & Barbara B. Oberg eds., 1998); FELLER, supra note 12, at 6.
52 THE FEDERALIST NO. 38, supra note 47. For a more complete discussion, see Schmitt, supra note 7, at 467–69.
53
ONUF, supra note 35, at 49, 62–64.
46
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The second organizing principle of Confederation land policy was that any
new states created from the territories would be equal to the original in terms of
sovereignty. Through charters and land grants, the British Crown had granted
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Virginia, North and South Carolina,
and Georgia territory extending to the Pacific Ocean.54 To encourage cessions
from the states, Congress passed a resolution in 1780 providing that any territory ceded to the federal government would “be settled and formed into distinct
republican states” that would “become members of the federal union” with “the
same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as the [original]
states.”55 Soon afterwards, Virginia, which had the most significant western
land claims, passed an act of cession in 1781.56 Like Congress’s 1780 resolution, Virginia’s act of cession provided that the new states formed from the territory must have the same “rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence, as
the other states.”57 By accepting Virginia’s cession in 1784, Congress again
promised that the new states would be created on terms of equality.58
Later legislation reaffirmed the Confederation Congress’s commitment to
equal state sovereignty. The Ordinance of 1784, which was designed by Thomas Jefferson, established a system to organize the new territories and promised
each new state an equal place in the Union.59 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
similarly pledged that all new states would be admitted “on an equal footing”
with the existing states.60 In fact, the equality of the new states was inherent in
the framers’ conceptualization of the territorial system. The Northwest Ordinance was widely considered to be a charter for the territories analogous to the
British charters for the original colonies.61 The leading scholar of the Ordinance, Peter Onuf, explains, “[t]his usage permitted the identification of new
states with old: the American colonies in the West would recapitulate the colonial experience of the original states and then be recognized as their equals.”62
A third principle that can be gleaned from the Confederation period is that
the United States would retain title to federal land after statehood. The Northwest Ordinance states: “[t]he Legislatures of those districts, or new States, shall
never interfere with the primary disposal of the Soil by the United States in
Congress Assembled, nor with any regulations Congress may find necessary
54

JAMES RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 82 (2d ed. 2009).
See Arthur Bestor, Constitutionalism and the Settlement of the West: The Attainment of
Consensus, 1754–1784, in THE AMERICAN TERRITORIAL SYSTEM 13, 21 (John Porter Bloom
ed., 1973) (quoting 18 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774–1789 915 (Wash.
Gov’t Printing Office 1910)).
56 Appel, supra note 7, at 21–22. By 1802, each of the landholding states had ceded its territory to the federal government. See RASBAND ET AL., supra note 54, at 84.
57 The Virginia Cession, IND. HISTORICAL BOARD, https://www.in.gov/history/2898.htm [htt
ps://perma.cc/5K5Q-6ADB] (last visited: Nov. 5, 2019).
58 Id.
59 ONUF, supra note 35, at xix.
60 Id. at 50.
61 Id. at xx, 72.
62
Id. at xx, 49–50.
53
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for securing the title in such soil to the bona fide purchasers.”63 The Ordinance
therefore explicitly contemplated continued federal land ownership after statehood. More fundamentally, many agreed with the declaration of the Maryland
legislature in 1776 that because the public lands were obtained with the “blood
and treasure of the United States, such lands ought to be considered as a common stock.”64 Congress’s 1780 Resolution, moreover, guaranteed that any
lands ceded to the United States would be “disposed of for the common benefit
of the United States.”65 Giving the public lands away at statehood would have
been inconsistent with this commitment to use the public lands for the common
benefit.66
Although the history of the Founding does not resolve the issue of Congress’s regulatory power over federal land, the language of the Northwest Ordinance suggests that Congress would have a more limited role over federal
land after statehood. The Ordinance prohibits the states from interfering with
federal regulations “necessary[] for securing title.”67 The Ordinance does not
appear to contemplate that any other type of federal regulation would exist, and
it certainly does not preserve Congress’s power to preempt state legislation.
And yet, the Ordinance makes federal title stronger than that of an ordinary
landowner. Specifically, it provides that the states could not tax federal property, regulate its disposition, or otherwise interfere with federal land ownership.68
The Ordinance is thus consistent with this Article’s proposed interpretation of
the Property Clause—namely that Congress would have the regulatory power
of an ordinary proprietor, but federal title to the land would receive special protections from state interference.
Moreover, the lack of meaningful debate over the Property Clause during
ratification suggests that the anti-federalists did not see it as a source of danger
to state sovereignty. According to Professor Peter Appel, a leading scholar on
the Property Clause, “the antifederalists generally ignored the Property Clause
and the power of the federal government over the West.”69 If the antifederalists had thought that the Property Clause gave Congress the ability to retain an unlimited police power over potentially vast tracks of federally owned
land within new states, however, the anti-federalists surely would have objected.70
63

Id. at 63.
See BLAKE A. WATSON, BUYING AMERICA FROM THE INDIANS: JOHNSON V. MCINTOSH AND
THE HISTORY OF NATIVE LAND RIGHTS 110–16 (2012) (emphasis omitted).
65 See Bestor, supra note 55.
66 See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 517–18.
67 ONUF, supra note 35, at 47.
68 Id.
69 Appel, supra note 7, at 28.
70 This argument is sometimes referred to as the curious incident of the dog that didn’t bark.
Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of Congress’s Failure to Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157, 158 (2012) (quoting SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver
Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 383, 397 (1953)).
64
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: BEYOND THE FOUNDING AND COURT
PRECEDENT
Although Founding Era sources do not speak directly to the issue of Congress’s regulatory authority over federal land within the states, the issue
emerged repeatedly in Congress during the early nineteenth century. Because
scholars have focused on the Founding and Supreme Court precedent, this historical evidence has largely gone unnoticed within the scholarship on Congress’s regulatory powers under the Property Clause.71 And yet, as prominent
legal historian David Currie demonstrates, “it was in the legislative and executive branches, not in the courts, that the original understanding of the Constitution was forged.”72 This history reveals a widespread belief that Congress’s
regulatory powers under the Property Clause were limited to those of an ordinary proprietor after statehood.
Constitutional history from beyond the founding period is an important factor in constitutional interpretation. In NLRB v. Noel Canning, for example, the
Court explained that it “has treated [historical] practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is subject to
dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”73 According
to Justice Scalia, post-ratification history is “a critical tool of constitutional interpretation” because it provides strong evidence of original public meaning.74
Historical practices can also be important to originalist theories of construction
when the original public meaning of the text does not provide a concrete answer.75 Moreover, scholars who believe in a living constitution typically look to
“ground[] constitutional interpretation in all of our constitutional history, rather
than in the history of the Founding alone.”76

71

See supra text accompanying note 7. Of course, historians have discussed these debates at
length in other contexts. See, e.g., VAN ATTA, supra note 12, at 17–18.
72 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801–1829 xi
(2001). Currie’s exhaustive treatment of the Constitution in Congress includes a chapter on
the public lands that covers many of the same issues discussed in this Article. See id. at 90–
91.
73 Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 525 (2014).
74 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605 (2008) (relying on nineteenth-century
history to determine the original public meaning of the Second Amendment).
75 The Founders believed that, when the text was unclear, deliberate actions from Congress
or the judiciary would “settle” or “liquidate” constitutional meaning and thus provide a
“permanent exposition of the constitution.” See Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 527 (2003) (quoting James Madison).
76 See Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 7 (1998); see also Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—And Through it, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1627, 1638 (1997) (“the history that matters is not confined to the Founding, or to specific Founding moments”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1996) (“the Constitution should be followed [in part] because its
provisions reflect judgments that have been accepted by many generations in a variety of
circumstances”).
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A. Tennessee
Tennessee was the first state to emerge from the territories of the United
States.77 Congress admitted Tennessee to the Union in 1796 with the understanding that the United States would retain title to all unappropriated federal
lands.78 That same year, in a letter to Andrew Jackson, who was serving in
Congress, Tennessee Governor John Sevier argued that the United States’ right
to the vacant lands had ended with Tennessee’s statehood.79 He asserted that, if
the United States were to retain title, “we should not equally stand possessed of
those free and independent rights the original States enjoy.”80 When Jackson
wrote back to Sevier, he agreed that continued federal landownership was inconsistent with state equality because “the right to the Soil in my oppinion [sic]
is so firmly invested in the sovereignty of the State.”81
Congress appointed a committee to investigate Tennessee’s land claims.82
Its report, which was written in 1800, is a remarkably clear exposition of the
central thesis of this Article—although the United States retains title to the public lands, its regulatory power is ceded to the states upon admission to the Union. The report distinguishes “the right of soil,” which is recognized as title to
the land, and “jurisdiction,” which is the power to regulate.83 The report explains that, upon admission to the Union, “Tennessee acquired the jurisdiction
over, but not the right of soil, within the said territory.”84 The report then states:
And this is the more satisfactorily evinced to the committee, from the consideration, that the Government of the United States held only a limited and
temporary jurisdiction over the said territory, determinable on an event foreseen
and specified; which the Government of the United States could not control; and
upon which, the inhabitants and territory were to become an independent State
or States of the Union. . . .
There is, therefore, no ground for the claim of Tennessee to the soil, upon
the principle that a grant of the jurisdiction over [the] territory possesses the
right of soil therein; because, in fact, there is no grant of jurisdiction from the

77

See Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 666.
See id. Andrew Jackson, then a delegate to the Tennessee Constitutional Convention, and
others argued that the new state should be given title to all land within its borders. Congress,
however, rebuffed this argument, and it was dropped by the convention in its attempt to gain
admission. Id. at 667.
79 Letter from John Sevier to Andrew Jackson (Dec. 12, 1796), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW
JACKSON 102 (Sam B. Smith & Harriet Chappell Owsley eds., 1980).
80 Id.
81 Letter from Andrew Jackson to John Sevier (Jan. 18, 1797), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ANDREW
JACKSON 117 (Sam B. Smith & Harriet Chappell Owsley eds., 1980). Governor Sevier and
the Tennessee legislature also used this constitutional argument to justify claims to Cherokee
land that were guaranteed by federal law. Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 668.
82 See Ablavsky, supra note 7, at 669.
83 See id. at 641.
84 1 1st CONG.–23rd CONG., AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND
EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 98
(Walter Lowrie ed., 1834).
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United States to the State of Tennessee.But the right of jurisdiction, and the right
of soil, are distinct rights, and may be severed
. . . . And it became a duty in the United States, by virtue of the same deed,
to exercise jurisdiction over the territory until it grew into a State. The United
States did exercise jurisdiction accordingly, until that event took place; upon
which, that duty ceased, and the jurisdiction was of right necessarily in the
State; but the right of soil remained in the United States. . . .85

When the issue first arose in 1800, therefore, Congress articulated a limited
interpretation of its regulatory power under the Property Clause.86
B. The Enabling Acts and Missouri Crisis
Although the issue then lay dormant for the next several decades, the enabling acts of the new states were fully consistent with a limited view of federal
power. Ohio’s Enabling Act of 1802 set a precedent that would be followed in
all new states.87 As promised in the Northwest Ordinance, the Enabling Act
specified that Ohio would be admitted “on an equal footing with the original
States in all respects whatever.”88 It further provided that Ohio could not violate the Northwest Ordinance, which prohibited the states from interfering with
federal landownership after statehood.89 The Enabling Act also conditioned
Ohio’s admission on agreeing to exempt not only federal land from taxation,
but also any land sold by the federal government for a period of five years from
the date of sale.90 This provision was included at the insistence of Treasury
Secretary Albert Gallatin, who was concerned that state taxation could make
federal land less marketable to out-of-state purchasers.91 The enabling acts of
the new states thus explicitly protected federal title from any state interference;
however, they did nothing to preserve federal regulatory power.
The explosive congressional debates over Missouri’s admission to the Union are also revealing. In 1819, Representative James Tallmadge of New York
proposed legislation that would have admitted Missouri only on the condition

85

Id. (emphasis added).
In 1806, Congress accommodated Tennessee’s demands for the public lands by ceding
title to land in the east while retaining land in the western portion of the state. See Ablavsky,
supra note 7, at 669–70. Congress then ceded most of this remaining federal land to the state
in 1841. See id. at 670.
87 See GERALD L. GUTEK, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN EDUCATION 173 (3d
ed. 1970).
88 See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 285, 289 (1968).
89 Id. at 288.
90 Id. at 292. In exchange, Congress granted lands to Ohio and revenue from land sales for
internal improvements. Id.
91 See Letter from Albert Gallatin to William B. Giles (Feb. 13, 1802), in 1 THE WRITINGS
OF ALBERT GALLATIN 76 (Henry Adams ed., Antiquarian Press 1960) (1879); JOHN LAURITZ
LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR
GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES 54 (2001).
86
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that it ban slavery.92 In a series of debates that threatened to tear the Union
apart, Northerners insisted that Congress had plenary power to impose conditions on the admission of new states, while Southerners replied that no such
conditions could undermine the equal sovereignty of the states.93 According to
historian John Van Atta, prominent southerners like Henry Clay of Kentucky,
the Speaker of the House, “believed that republicanism in America required
that all members of the Union stand on an equal footing, no state intrinsically
inferior to another. In that sense, Clay like other southerners regarded selfgovernment, not slavery, as the fundamental issue in the Missouri debate.”94
With disunion looming as a realistic possibility, Congress eventually admitted Missouri as a state without any restrictions on its sovereignty.95 In exchange for what practically amounted to the admission of Missouri as a slave
state, Congress also admitted Maine, which would become a free state.96 Congress thus accepted the southern argument for equal sovereignty within the new
states, though it banned slavery within the federal territories north of Missouri’s
southern border.97
After Congress passed the Compromise, Missouri proposed a constitution
that made it illegal for the state legislature to free any slave and required the
state to enact legislation to prevent free blacks from entering the state.98 The
proposal arguably violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
as several northern states conferred citizenship on African Americans.99 James
Madison wrote to President Monroe that “[t]here can be no doubt that the
clause, if agst. [sic] the Constitution of the U.S. would be a nullity; it being impossible for Congress . . . to vary the political equality of the States” by admitting a state on unequal terms.100 Congress ultimately admitted Missouri on
“equal terms” with the original states but also explicitly prohibited the state
from enacting legislation that would violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.101 Although the Property Clause was not central to the Missouri Crisis,102 it reveals both that the equal sovereignty principle was widely thought to
92

Technically, it would have prohibited the entry of additional slaves and required the Missouri legislature to pass an act for the gradual emancipation of all slaves within the state. See
JOHN VAN ATTA, WOLF BY THE EARS: THE MISSOURI CRISIS, 1819–1821 1 (2015).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 96.
95 Id. at 99.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 116.
99 Id.
100 Letter from James Madison to James Monroe (Nov. 19, 1820), (on file with FOUNDERS
ONLINE, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.), https://founders.archives.gov/documents/
Madison/04-02-02-0132 [https://perma.cc/ZQ64-8JY3].
101 VAN ATTA, supra note 92, at 120.
102 Aside from antislavery extremists, there was a general consensus that Missouri, like all
previous states, would be admitted on an equal footing. Id. at 88. The constitutional debate
was about whether Congress’s power to admit new states included a power to impose condi-
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constrain congressional power and that Congress had complete regulatory authority within the territories.103
C. Western Demands for Cession
Congress again explicitly debated its Property Clause powers in a series of
high-profile debates over the public lands from 1828 to 1837.104 By the late
1820s, federal authorities had put millions of acres of land within the new states
up for sale.105 With a minimum price of $1.25 per acre, however, supply far exceeded demand.106 When Congress rebuffed efforts from congressmen like
Missouri’s Thomas Hart Benton to gradually reduce the price of unsold land
the longer it remained on the market (a policy known as “graduation”), frustrated and impatient westerners resurrected the constitutional argument for ceding
the public lands to the states.107
During 1828, the legislatures of Illinois, Indiana, and Louisiana petitioned
Congress to cede the public lands within their borders to the state governments.108 The Indiana petition, for example, asserted that the state “has the exclusive right to the soil and eminent domain of all the unappropriated lands
within her acknowledged boundaries[.]”109 Like Tennessee’s earlier claims,
western demands for the public lands were based on the doctrine of equal state
sovereignty. Senator William Hendricks of Indiana, for example, argued that
“the equality and sovereignty of the new States require that these States should
have the control of the public lands within their limits. . . .”110 Senator John
McKinley of Alabama, who would later serve as an associate justice on the Supreme Court, similarly contended “that the United States cannot hold land in
any State of the Union, except for the purposes enumerated in the Constitution;
and whatever right they had to the soil while the country remained under territions prior to admission. The Property Clause was mentioned only to contrast Congress’s
power over territories with that over the states. See The Right of Congress to Restrict Slavery, MO. INTELLIGENCER (Franklin, Missouri), Feb. 18, 1820 (arguing that the Property
Clause could not justify the ban on slavery in Missouri because, after statehood, it “only
gives Congress the same power over the property of the United States which every individual has over his own.”); VAN ATTA, supra note 92, at 82–83 (summarizing the argument of
Missourian Nathaniel Beverly Tucker).
103 Van Atta summarizes the Compromise as follows: “[e]ach section received a vital concession: the North, ample room . . . for free-labor expansion; the South and West, the right of
new states to determine their own economic future with very limited congressional interference.” VAN ATTA, supra note 92, at 4.
104 See infra Section II.C.
105 ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE FASHIONING OF
AMERICA 131 (2006).
106 Id. at 118.
107 See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 473–74.
108 5 20TH CONG., AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 622, 624, 630 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860).
109 Id. at 630.
110
4 REG. DEB. 152 (1828).
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torial governments, passed to the States formed over the same territory on their
admission into the Union, on an equal footing with the old States.”111 The states
had a right to the lands upon admission, McKinley argued, because “sovereignty is necessarily and inseparably connected with the territory and right of
soil.”112 These prominent western politicians forcefully argued that the new
states could not be equal in sovereignty as long as the United States retained
title to the public lands.113
A close examination of the western argument, however, reveals that its
proponents did not understand Congress to have an unlimited regulatory power
over federal land within the states. western leaders like McKinley and Hendricks complained that federal ownership of the lands displaced state sovereignty. More specifically, McKinley complained that the new states were unequal because “they have been deprived of the right of disposing of, or in any
manner interfering with the disposition of the public land, or any regulations
that Congress may choose to make for securing to the purchasers any title it
[may] choose to grant; [and] they have been deprived of the right of taxing the
lands belonging to the United States[.]”114 McKinley thus complained only that
federal title displaced state power to sell and tax the land. If he and other westerners had thought that Congress also had an unlimited regulatory power over
federal land within the states, they almost certainly would have said so. Instead,
McKinley complained only that Congress could regulate “for securing to the
purchasers any title it [may] choose to grant.”115
As I have detailed elsewhere, Congress overwhelmingly rejected the western argument for the public lands.116 The leading statesmen from each political
party and section (including many westerners) argued that the new states had
no right to own the public lands within their borders. Because the United States
had owned land within the new states since the time of Tennessee’s admission
to the Union in 1796, James Madison, the father of the Constitution, asserted
that “the title in the people of the United States rests on a foundation too just
and solid to be shaken by any technical or metaphysical arguments whatever.”117 Many also opposed giving the public lands to the states because a central
111

Id. at 508.
Id. at 509.
113 Ninian Edwards, the Governor of Illinois and a former U.S. senator, offered perhaps the
most complete argument against U.S. landholding in two addresses to the Illinois legislature.
See NINIAN W. EDWARDS, HISTORY OF ILLINOIS, FROM 1778 TO 1833 AND
LIFE AND TIMES OF NINIAN EDWARDS 112–13 (Arno Press 1975) (1870); Ninian Edwards,
Governor of Ill., An Address to Both Houses of the Legislature (Dec. 7, 1830), at 12, in ILL.
INTELLIGENCER (Vandalia, Robert Blackwell 1830); Schmitt, supra note 7, at 474–75 (summarizing Edwards’ argument).
114 4 REG. DEB., supra note 110, at 509.
115 Id.
116 See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 471–91.
117 Letter from James Madison (June 28, 1831), in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 187–88 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
112
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authority was needed to control land sales for the good of the Union. Kentucky
Senator Henry Clay, for example, argued that “[c]ollisions between the States
would probably arise” from state ownership of the public lands, and a “spirit of
hazardous speculation would be engendered.”118 Many further argued that giving the public lands away to the citizens of the western states would violate a
constitutional duty to use the land for the common benefit of the Union.119
Leading members of the nationalistic Whig Party also developed a comprehensive response to the western constitutional argument based on equal state
sovereignty. Known as the National Republican Party or Adams Democrats
during the 1820s, they favored a strong federal government that would use internal improvements, a national bank, protective tariffs, and land policy to spur
development and national cohesion.120 In sum, the Whigs argued that federal
landholding within the states did not violate equal state sovereignty because
Congress had no more regulatory authority over such land than an ordinary
proprietor. This evidence is powerful because, as more fully developed in the
following section, the opposing Democratic Party was far more committed to
state sovereignty and limited federal power.121
Daniel Webster, the famous “expounder of the Constitution” and leader of
the Whig Party in the North, was generally a strong champion of the Union and
federal power.122 In response to demands for cession of the public lands, however, he rejected the ability of Congress to preempt state regulations on federal
land. He explained that “the Senate had heard much relative to the thraldom
[sic] under which the new States were; of their being subjected to another legislation; of the condition of individuals who could not get a little act passed without coming to Congress.”123 The “thralldom” he referenced was the supposed
power of Congress to preempt state regulatory power. However, “[h]e wished
to say that, so far as respects the equality of footing upon which the new States
stood to the old, he saw no reason to impute inferiority.”124 This was because
“[t]he [g]eneral Government exercised no legislation over the land lying in a
State, except so far as that State had agreed to it. No power was now exercised
by the Government over the new States which had not been exercised over the
118

6 21ST CONG., AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN RELATION TO THE PUBLIC LANDS 446 (Asbury Dickins & John W. Forney eds.,
Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860).
119 See Schmitt, supra note 7, at 517–18.
120 The National Republic Party merged with other groups in the 1830s to form the Whig
Party as a way to oppose the policies of Democratic President Andrew Jackson. See
MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY: JACKSONIAN
POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 26 (2003). For the sake of simplicity, this paper
will refer to this political coalition as the Whig Party.
121 See id. at 136.
122 See ROBERT V. REMINI, DANIEL WEBSTER: THE MAN AND HIS TIME 162, 167 (1997);
Daniel Webster, HISTORY.COM (Nov. 9, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/19th-century
/daniel-webster [https://perma.cc/UT8R-THRC].
123 13 REG. DEB. 785 (1837).
124
Id.
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old.”125 In other words, Webster argued that the new states were not held in an
unequal state of “thralldom” because federal landownership did not confer upon Congress the power to displace a state’s legislation without its consent.126
Senator David Barton of Missouri, the chairman of the Senate Committee
on Public Lands, similarly argued that federal landholding was consistent with
equal state sovereignty. While the argument for cession relied on the assumption that soil and jurisdiction (i.e., landownership and regulatory power) were
indivisible, Barton contended that “the answer to these new notions is, there is
no such thing as absolute State sovereignty over all subjects.”127 Under the
Constitution, Congress had the power to own and sell the public lands, whereas
the state retained the power to otherwise regulate them.128 He explained: “[i]f
infractions of State laws happen upon public lands within her limits, they are
cognizable by State authority; and Missouri possesses all the kinds of power or
sovereignty that New York does, although she has no grand canal upon which
to exercise her powers.”129 According to Barton, federal landholding in Missouri was constitutional only because Missouri retained regulatory authority
over the land.
Senator Henry Clay of Kentucky likewise asserted that, after statehood,
Congress’s powers over federal land were “[n]othing more nor less than that of
a proprietor, which drew after it no legislative powers whatever.”130 He thus
argued that, “when these States were erected, they had otherwise the same
power over it as the old States. The legislative power of Congress over the territory ceased to exist.”131 Like Webster, Clay was an influential leader of the
Whig Party who pushed for a strong national government that could build internal improvements like roads and canals.132 His limited interpretation of Congress’s Property Clause power is thus significant, as a broader interpretation
could have helped to remove the constitutional doubts that plagued federal improvement projects.133
James Noble, Indiana’s first U.S. senator, favored cession as a matter of
policy but rejected the argument that it was constitutionally mandated. Noble
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argued that “the soil and taxation are separable from the sovereignty” of a
state.134 He explained that “[t]he right of domain or estate may be owned by
others, within the limits of a State—possessing sovereignty, where that sovereignty cannot tax the soil.”135 Noble thus argued that federal title, which differed from private title because the land could not be taxed or seized by eminent domain, was fully consistent with state sovereignty over the land. If “the
rights of soil and taxation are inseparable from the sovereignty of every independent State,” he argued, then Virginia’s act of cession, the Northwest Ordinance, and the U.S. Constitution “are frauds” because each preserved federal
title and was committed to equal state sovereignty.136 Noble further asserted
that “[t]he moment Indiana, or any other new State, was admitted into this Union, the State possessed sovereignty[,] . . . [and its] sovereignty was complete,
upon the admission of the State into this Union.”137
While Webster, Barton, Clay, and Noble all explicitly said that Congress’s
Property Clause power was limited, many others agreed with the division between soil and jurisdiction that was central to their argument. A special House
committee on public land policy in 1829, for example, repeatedly noted that the
original states ceded “sovereignty and soil” or “jurisdiction and soil” to the
United States over the territories.138 When discussing federal land in 1829,
however, the committee’s report stated only that an “indisputable right of soil
yet remains in the United States.”139 Such statements imply that, although Congress had the power to regulate and own land during the territorial stage, the
states inherited regulatory power at statehood.
Others refuted the constitutional argument for cession by stressing that the
new states had all agreed by statute to give up any right to ownership of the
public lands within their borders.140 This argument assumes that, without such a
voluntary agreement, the states would have inherited title and jurisdiction over
the lands. As noted above, however, these acts preserved only federal title and
said nothing about federal regulatory authority. Sovereignty—the political
power to regulate—therefore was not voluntarily surrendered by the states.
It is worth stressing that, in these debates over cession of the public lands,
both sides agreed that Congress could not use its powers to violate the principle
of equal state sovereignty. When westerners argued that continued federal
landownership within the new states violated the principle, Congress did not
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reject equal sovereignty as a limit on its powers.141 Instead, congressional leaders constructed a constitutional argument to explain why federal ownership was
fully consistent with equal state sovereignty. In sum, Congress defeated the
constitutional argument for cession by disclaiming any sovereignty over federal
land within the states.
D. Native American Sovereignty
At roughly the same time that westerners were demanding cession of the
federal lands within their borders, Georgia and other southern states asserted
authority over the Cherokee and other Native American tribes within their borders.142 Although the Property Clause was rarely invoked, many of the same
constitutional arguments about the scope and nature of state sovereignty were
raised in the ensuing debates.143 The constitutional crisis over tribal sovereignty
thus confirms that the Jacksonian coalition shared the Whigs’ limited view of
federal power under the Property Clause.
Tribal sovereignty is a complicated issue, and the formal law was relatively
undeveloped in the 1820s.144 In practice, however, the United States had long
entered into treaties with the tribes and had largely refrained from interfering
with their internal governance.145 The Treaty of Holston, signed by President
Washington in 1791, pledged that the United States would protect the Cherokee
Nation, guaranteed Cherokee lands within specified borders, and gave the United States “the sole and exclusive right of regulating their trade.”146 In 1802,
Georgia ceded its western land claims (present day Alabama and Mississippi)
to the United States in exchange for a promise that the federal government
would “peaceably” extinguish Indian title to lands within the state “on reasonable terms.”147 By the 1820s, however, many tribes decided to retain their lands
no matter the price offered.148 In fact, the Cherokee declared themselves to be
141
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an independent nation with an absolute right to soil and jurisdiction, effectively
declaring that they would never dispose of their lands.149
Georgia responded by asserting jurisdiction over Cherokee lands and announcing that state law would be enforced against all members of the tribe
within Georgia’s borders.150 The Jackson Administration supported Georgia’s
claim and urged the Cherokee to move to the western territories. In a letter to
the Cherokee delegation, Secretary of War John Eaton warned that the federal
government could not support the Cherokee in any conflict over Georgia’s assertion of jurisdiction because the “right . . . of denying the exercise of sovereignty to that state within her own limits, cannot be admitted;—It is not within
the range of powers granted by the state to the general government.”151 He further said that “to continue where you are, within the territorial limits of an independent state can promise you nothing but interruption and disquietude.”152
President Jackson similarly supported Georgia in his first annual message.
Jackson noted that Georgia was a “sovereign state” and that “Alabama was admitted into the Union on the same footing with the original States.”153 He thus
argued that “[t]here is no constitutional, conventional, or legal provision which
allows [Georgia and Alabama] less power over the Indians within their borders
than is possessed by Maine or New York.”154 The federal government, he argued, therefore had no power to protect the Cherokee “if they remain within the
limits of the States.”155
Jackson’s supporters then introduced the Indian Removal Act, which set
aside land in the western territories for eastern tribes and authorized the federal
government to assist in the removal of any Indian who resisted the application
of state law.156 Opposition to the bill was fierce. Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen, the leader of the opposition,157 argued that Congress had “the entire jurisdiction and control” over relations with Indians.158 Congress’s exclusive
power, he argued, derived from the Indian Commerce Clause and the power to
enter into treaties, which became the supreme law of the land.159 Under the
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Treaty of Holston, Frelinghuysen argued, the federal government had a duty to
announce it would resist “all interference and encroachment” from Georgia.160
Even if no treaty had existed, Frelinghuysen argued, “[t]he laws of the
State can have no effect upon a tribe of Indians or their lands within a State, so
long as that tribe is independent and not a member of the State.”161 This was so,
he contended, because the tribes “hold by better title than either Georgia or the
Union. They have nothing to do with State sovereignty, or United States, sovereignty. They are above and beyond both.”162 The Cherokee were “as perfectly
independent of them [the states] as they are of Mexico.”163 Georgia’s sovereignty, Frelinghuysen thus argued, simply did not extend into Cherokee territory.164
Senator Peleg Sprague of Maine further argued that historical practice supported Cherokee sovereignty. “From the organization of the Government down
to this very session of Congress,” he asserted, there had been an “unbroken and
invariable” practice of entering into treaties with Native Tribes as sovereign political actors.165 This history was important, he explained, because
“[c]ontemporary exposition has always been deemed of great force in settling
even the most difficult questions of constitutional law. Practice and precedent,
too, have often been considered as decisive authority.”166 Sprague thus asserted
that “[i]f authority and practice can settle any question, this is at an end.”167 Because federal treaties were the “supreme law of the land,” he concluded, Georgia’s attempt to annul Cherokee sovereignty was invalid.168
John Forsyth of Georgia, among others, rose to defend the Removal Act on
the Senate floor. He argued that the Cherokee were not an independent sovereign because, under his reading of the Treaty of Holston, the United States obtained sovereignty over the Cherokee people.169 In the 1802 compact with
Georgia, he further asserted, the United States agreed to “cede to the State of
Georgia, whatever claim, right, or title, they may have to the jurisdiction and
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soil” of the land within its borders.170 In sum, “[t]he United States obtained, by
treaty, the power to legislate over the Cherokees, and transferred it to Georgia.”171 He further argued that, because the United States had violated its
agreement with Georgia by failing to extinguish Cherokee title, Georgia was
justified in taking matters into its own hands.172 Forsyth thus argued that Georgia’s actions were valid under federal law.
Like the Jackson Administration, Forsyth and other congressmen further
argued that the federal government lacked the power to grant the Cherokee
sovereignty over land within a state.173 The Constitution, he asserted, “gives to
the [g]eneral [g]overnment no power . . . to limit the jurisdiction or narrow the
sovereignty of one of the States.”174 Even before the Founding, he argued,
“[t]he States claimed as common property our Western lands, as obtained by
the expenditure of common blood and common treasure.”175 The states
“claimed the soil of the wild land for the Confederation; leaving the jurisdiction
to the State where the land lay.”176 Channeling the equal sovereignty argument,
Forsyth pointed out that Georgia had “followed the example of ten States, in
the exercise of jurisdiction over the Indians within their territory. All the New
England States, New York, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Maryland, escape censure for similar acts.”177
Congressman and future Supreme Court Justice James Wayne of Georgia
similarly declared: “[w]e ask for no more than other States have and continue
to exercise, without having their claims of jurisdiction over the Indians in their
limits questioned. . . .”178 Wayne further contended that “[s]overeignty over soil
is the attribute of States; and it can never be affirmed of tribes living in a savage condition.”179 The Indians, Wayne claimed, “were proprietors of what they
used, so long as it was used; but not sovereigns of any part.”180 Senator Robert
Adams of Mississippi likewise argued that “everyone living within the boundaries of a particular state is subject to the laws of that state. Otherwise chaos
reigns.”181
Supporters of the Indian Removal Act, however, acknowledged that Congress could grant independence to the tribes in the federal territories. Forsyth,
for example, said that “[t]he right of the United States to contract with, or legislate for, the Indians, beyond the States, is not denied; it is a necessary conse170
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quence of the controlling power of the Government over the territories of the
Union.”182 Under their view, however, the United States had far less authority
over land located within a state.183 With Jackson’s support, Congress passed the
Indian Removal Act in 1830.184
The issue finally reached the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia in
1832. The case arose when Georgia prosecuted a group of missionaries who
lived with the Cherokee but refused to swear an oath to support Georgia’s
laws.185 The Court held that the conviction was void because Georgia’s laws
“interfere forcibly with the relations between the United States and the Cherokee nation, the regulation of which, according to the settled principles of our
constitution, is committed exclusively to the government of the union.”186 The
Court further held that “the Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no
force.”187 The Court therefore adopted the same constitutional arguments raised
by Senators Frelinghuysen and Sprague in opposition to the Indian Removal
Act.
Despite their victory in court, the Cherokee lost their land to the State of
Georgia. Georgia did not enforce the Court’s decision in Worcester.188 The Indian Removal Act and adherence to Worcester then became important issues
during the election of 1832.189 Jackson’s principal rival was Senator Henry
Clay, who had earlier comprehensively defended U.S. landownership by disclaiming federal regulatory power.190 Clay criticized Jackson for undermining
the power of the Court, violating treaties with Native Americans, and persecuting missionaries.191 However, Jackson won the Electoral College by a commanding margin of 219 to 49.192 Jackson then persuaded the governor of Georgia to pardon the missionaries to avoid further escalation.193 When conflict with
Georgia and the U.S. government appeared possible, a faction of the Cherokee
signed a treaty agreeing to removal.194 Although the Cherokee National Coun182
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cil refused to approve the treaty, the federal government forced the Cherokee
people and other Native Americans to remove to the West.195 Tens of thousands of Native Americans were forced from their homes, and thousands perished as a result.196
Not only did Worcester fail to protect the Cherokee, but it has never been
fully accepted as precedent. As early as 1835, the Tennessee Supreme Court
rejected Worcester and upheld the application of Tennessee law over Cherokee
territory.197 The Tennessee Court held that Worcester was inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh, which held that the
United States possessed title to Indian lands through the doctrine of discovery
and that Native tribes had only a right of occupancy.198 According to Professor
Blake Watson, “Worcester was stillborn in the federal courts as well.”199 Van
Buren’s appointees to the Court, including John McKinley of Alabama who
had earlier argued for cession,200 ignored Worcester and relied on Johnson.
Worcester has never been overruled, but to this day the courts rely on the reasoning of Johnson for issues of tribal land ownership and sovereignty.201
Although the Property Clause was not explicitly discussed in the constitutional crisis over tribal sovereignty, the debates reveal that the Democratic Party embraced the same constitutional principles that the Whigs had advanced at
roughly the same time in the debates over cession. Jackson and his supporters
in Congress argued that the United States lacked the power to displace a state’s
sovereignty over the land within its borders.202 They further contended that, if
the Cherokee were sovereign, Georgia would not be an equal member of the
Union.203 As demonstrated above, these are the very same constitutional arguments that Whigs like Clay and Webster raised when explaining why federal
landownership did not displace state sovereignty. Because Jacksonians broadly
argued that the states must have sovereignty over the land within their borders,
it is reasonable to presume that they thought the same with respect to land
owned by the United States. Indeed, the United States held title to far more land
in the new states than any Native American tribe did, so the constitutional argument for state sovereignty would seem to carry even more force with respect
to federal land. In sum, the Jacksonians’ constitutional arguments against tribal
sovereignty implied that they had a limited view of Congress’s regulatory power under the Property Clause as well.
195
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The Indian Removal Act further confirms that Jacksonians viewed federal
power over land within the states very differently than such power over land
within the territories. Secretary Eaton promised the Cherokee that “[b]eyond
the Mississippi, your prospects will be different. There you will find no conflicting interests. The United States power, and sovereignty, uncontrolled by
the high authority of state jurisdiction,” he asserted, would be able to guarantee
Cherokee lands and independence.204 Jackson likewise said that the United
States could guarantee protection and independence only “without the limits of
any State or Territory now formed.”205 Although the Property Clause was not
explicitly referenced, the contrast between federal power within the states and
federal power over the territories is unmistakable.
The constitutional arguments of the opposition to the Indian Removal Act
were also consistent with a limited interpretation of federal power under the
Property Clause. Notably, the opposition did not attack the principle of equal
state sovereignty or the basic idea that the states presumptively had sovereignty
over all land within their borders. This is important, because the federal government owned most of the land in new states like Alabama and Mississippi.206
If that ownership conveyed unlimited sovereignty to the federal government,
then one might expect the opposition to argue that displacing state sovereignty
was common and unproblematic. Instead, the opposition focused on the unique
circumstances of tribal sovereignty. In sum, the opposition in Congress and the
Court in Worcester both argued that the tribes were distinct political communities outside the reach of state sovereignty, that the United States had the exclusive constitutional authority to deal with the tribes, and that federal treaties recognizing tribunal sovereignty were the supreme law of the land. These
arguments were fully consistent with state sovereignty over federally owned
land.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Jacksonians could have invoked an expansive interpretation of the Property Clause to support the Indian Removal
Act. In Johnson v. M’Intosh, the Supreme Court held that, although Native
Americans had a lawful right of occupancy, the United States held title to the
land through the doctrine of discovery.207 If the Jacksonians believed that federal ownership of land within Georgia conferred expansive regulatory authority
on Congress, the Property Clause almost surely would have been raised.
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III. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT: THE PROPERTY CLAUSE IN THE SUPREME COURT
A. Antebellum Cases
Early cases on the meaning of Property Clause reflect that the Supreme
Court shared Congress’s understanding. Although the Court held that Congress
had unlimited power with respect to the territories, the cases reveal that the justices had a much more limited view of federal power over property within the
states. Scholarly argument to the contrary is unpersuasive and has ignored the
larger context of the debates over the public lands in Congress.
In American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton, the Court held that Congress has complete regulatory authority over the federal territories.208 The case
arose when the owners of a shipment of cotton challenged the power of a court
created by the territorial legislature of Florida to render a decision in a salvage
case.209 In an opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, the Court held that the
territorial court was valid because Congress had authorized the territory to create such tribunals.210 In reaching this conclusion, Marshall held that Congress
had “the combined powers of the general, and of a state government” over the
territories.211 This power, Marshall explained, derived from a “general right of
sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which
enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.”212
Pollard v. Hagan, however, demonstrates that the Court had a more limited
interpretation of congressional power over federal land within the states.213 Pollard arose from a dispute over land in Alabama that was situated within the tidal zone of the Mobile River.214 The plaintiff in Pollard sought to eject the defendant based on an 1836 grant of title from Congress.215 The issue in the case
was thus whether Congress had the power to convey title to the land. The Court
held that, although Congress had authority over the land while Alabama was a
territory,216 Congress lost this power when Alabama became a state in 1819.217
The Court reasoned that, at the time of the Revolution, the sovereign power of
the states included “the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils
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under them for their own common use.”218 Because Alabama inherited such
sovereign power when it became a state, Congress’s attempt to convey the land
after Alabama’s statehood was void.219
Although the technical holding of Pollard is limited to navigable waters,
the Court went on to interpret Congress’s regulatory powers over federal land
within a state. The Court stated that, after Alabama became a state:
Nothing remained to the United States, according to the terms of the agreement,
but the public lands. And, if an express stipulation had been inserted in the
agreement, granting the municipal right of sovereignty and eminent domain to
the United States, such stipulation would have been void and inoperative; because the United States have no constitutional capacity to exercise municipal jurisdiction, sovereignty, or eminent domain, within the limits of a state or elsewhere, except in the cases in which it is expressly granted.220

The Court further explained that a federal “municipal right of sovereignty”
was “expressly granted” in federal land only under the Enclave Clause.221 The
Property Clause, the Court stated, did not confer such a power of regulation after statehood. It explained:
We, therefore, think the United States hold the public lands within the new states
by force of the deeds of cession, and the statutes connected with them, and not
by any municipal sovereignty which it may be supposed they possess, or have
reserved by compact with the new states, for that particular purpose. The provision of the Constitution above referred to shows that no such power can be exercised by the United States within a state. Such a power is not only repugnant
to the Constitution, but it is inconsistent with the spirit and intention of the deeds
of cession.222

Scholars who support a broad interpretation of the Property Clause correctly point out that the Court’s holding in Pollard was limited to the ownership of
land under navigable waters.223 The legal distinction between holding and dicta
is important to a court constrained by a higher authority or stare decisis. The
distinction, however, is much less important to the constitutional historian. Regardless of whether the Court’s language in Pollard would technically control
future cases, it stands as highly persuasive evidence of how the Court in 1845
understood the Constitution.
United States v. Gratiot, which was decided five years prior to Pollard, is
fully consistent with a limited reading of the Property Clause.224 Gratiot involved a challenge to a federal act passed in 1807 that allowed the president to
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lease lead mines in Indiana territory for a period of up to five years.225 Before
Illinois became a state, lead mines were leased to the defendant under the authority of the president.226 Not wishing to pay for the right to use the mines, the
defendants argued that, because the Property Clause grants the power to “dispose of” federal property, Congress had the “power only to sell, and not to
lease such lands.”227
In rejecting this argument, the Court did not hold that Congress has broad
regulatory power over federal land within a state. Scholars who support a broad
view of the Property Clause make much of the Court’s statement that Congress’s power under the Property Clause is “without limitation; and has been
considered the foundation upon which the territorial governments rest.”228
Placed in context, however, the Court meant only that Congress’s power was
“without limitation[s]” when the lease was originally formed at a time prior to
Indiana’s statehood.229 The Court further explained that achieving statehood did
not give Indiana any ground to “complain of any disposition or regulation of
the lead mines previously made by Congress.”230 Read in context, Gratiot
merely stands for the following unremarkable propositions: (1) Congress has
“unlimited” powers to legislate over a territory prior to statehood, (2) Congress’s power over federal property includes the power to lease and is not limited to a power to sell title in fee simple absolute, and (3) statehood does not
nullify a congressionally authorized disposition of federal land. These propositions are entirely consistent with Pollard’s narrow reading of congressional
regulatory power.
In his highly influential Commentaries on the Constitution, Justice Story
likewise interpreted Congress’s power over the territories more broadly than its
power over federal land within a state.231 According to Story, “[i]t was doubtless with reference principally to this territory [the Northwest Territory], that
the article of the constitution, now under consideration, was adopted.”232 Similarly, Story asserted that the Property Clause “was obviously proper, in order to
escape from the constitutional objection already stated to the power of congress
over the territory ceded to the United States under the confederation.”233 While
225

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 537; see also Appel, supra note 7, at 31–32; Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, supra note 7, at 509–10.
229 Gratiot, 39 U.S. at 537–38. In stating that “there can be no apprehensions of any encroachments upon state rights,” the Court stressed that “[t]he law of 1807, authorizing the
leasing of the lead mines, was passed before Illinois was organized as a state.” Id. at 538.
230 Id. (emphasis added).
231 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES; WITH A
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES,
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 1313 190 (Fred B. Rotham & Co. 1991)
(1833).
232 Id.
233
Id. § 1317, at 193.
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Story stated that the Property Clause gave Congress power over the territories,
he also asserted that Congress’s power was an incident of sovereignty. Citing to
American Insurance, he explained: “[a]s the general government possesses the
right to acquire territory, either by conquest, or by treaty, it would seem to follow, as an inevitable consequence, that it possesses the power to govern, what it
has so acquired.”234
With respect to federal land within a state, however, Story asserted that
Congress’s power was “not necessarily exclusive in all cases.”235 He explained:
“[i]f the national government own[s] a fort, arsenal, hospital, or lighthouse establishment, not so ceded [under the Enclave Clause], the general jurisdiction
of the state is not excluded in regard to the site; but, subject to the rightful exercise of the powers of the national government, it remains in full force.”236 Taken together, these two sentences imply that, while Congress could regulate federal property within a state pursuant to its enumerated powers (the “rightful
exercise of powers of the national government”), the states otherwise retain
“exclusive” jurisdiction.237 Story clearly believed that Congress’s power over
federal property within a state would be narrower in scope than its power over
the territories.
The Court reaffirmed its narrow understanding of the Property Clause in
the infamous Dred Scott decision.238 Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s opinion
for the Court notoriously held that African Americans could not be US citizens
and that Congress lacked the power to ban slavery in the territories.239 While
discussing Congress’s power to make “needful [r]ules and [r]egulations,”
Taney wrote that “whatever construction may now be given to these words,
every one, we think, must admit that they are not the words usually employed
by statesmen in giving supreme power of legislation.”240 He continued: “[t]hey
are certainly very unlike the words used in the power granted to legislate over
territory which the new [US] Government might afterwards itself obtain by
cession from a State” under the Enclave Clause.241 I zn fact, Taney declared,
“[t]hey are not the words usually employed by statesmen, when they mean to
give the powers of sovereignty.”242 Instead, Taney argued that “[t]he words
‘rules and regulations’ are usually employed in the Constitution in speaking of
some particular specified power which it means to confer on the Government,
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Id. § 1318, at 193–94.
Id. § 1322, at 198.
236 Id.
237 Appel suggests that Story meant that Congress retained a police power over territory
within a state that could preempt otherwise applicable state law. See Appel, supra note 7, at
34. As explained above, this is not the most plausible reading of the text.
238 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 436–37 (1856).
239 For more on Dred Scott, see generally, DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS (2001).
240 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 436–37.
241 Id. at 437.
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and not, as we have seen, when granting general powers of legislation.”243
Taney thus concluded that the Property Clause did not grant Congress a “despotic and unlimited power over persons and property.”244 Although Taney does
not precisely define Congress’s authority, he clearly had a limited view of federal regulatory power under the Property Clause.
Scholars of the Property Clause, however, have given little weight to Dred
Scott for at least two reasons. First, because Dred Scott represents an aggressively proslavery interpretation of the Constitution, scholars appear to assume
that the opinion’s interpretation of the Property Clause must also be incorrect.245 Although Dred Scott deserves to be condemned for its support for slavery, the Court’s narrow interpretation of the Property Clause was not responsible for its proslavery outcome. Importantly, Taney did not hold that Congress
lacked regulatory authority over the territories; instead, he held that Congress’s
power over the territories could be implied from its power to acquire them.246
The federal ban on slavery was unconstitutional, Taney held, because it denied
Southerners’ property rights in slaves without due process of law.247 The
Court’s narrow reading of the Property Clause was thus not inherently proslavery.
Moreover, disregarding the decision because of its association with slavery
would fail to seriously grapple with our country’s past. Although Dred Scott is
morally indefensible, prominent revisionist historians argue that its interpretation of the Constitution was consistent with white public opinion and possibly
even correct under prevailing legal doctrine.248 Legal scholarship therefore
should not pretend that the Court’s support for slavery was an aberration; instead, it must recognize that the Court’s proslavery viewpoint was part of the
antebellum political and constitutional order. Simply assuming that everything
in Dred Scott must be wrong would fail to take antebellum constitutional history seriously.
Second, scholars have probably ignored Dred Scott’s interpretation of the
Property Clause because the opinion is more commonly associated with the
more outlandish argument that the Clause does not apply to any newly acquired
territory. Justice Taney asserted that the Property Clause “applied only to the
property which the States held in common at that time [the Founding], and has
no reference whatever to any territory or other property which the new sovereignty might afterwards itself acquire.”249 He reached this conclusion by focusing on text and purpose. Because the text refers to “the territory” of the United
243
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Id. at 439.
245 See Appel, supra note 7, at 37 (“The proponents of the narrow view of the Property
Clause would not hinge their argument on such a hated decision . . . .”).
246 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 448.
247 Id. at 450.
248 See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 39
(2006).
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States, Taney argued that this proper noun must refer to specific land that was
identifiable at the time of ratification.250 Moreover, Taney asserted that the purpose of the Clause was to enable Congress to protect U.S. citizens in the territories so that the land ceded from the states could be sold to pay the national debt
from the Revolutionary War.251 He thus concluded that the Property Clause referred only to the land considered by the framers at the time of ratification.252
Like most modern scholars, this Article does not endorse Dred Scott’s narrow
interpretation of the scope of the land governed by the Property Clause.253 The
Court’s error as to the scope of the land covered by the Property Clause, however, simply has nothing to do with the Court’s interpretation of Congress’s
regulatory power over the land that is governed by the Clause. Rejecting the
Court’s interpretation of Congress’s power because of an unrelated legal error
elsewhere in the opinion is unwarranted.
B. Reconstruction to New Deal
Several late nineteenth century cases recognize also that Congress had a
general police power over the territories. In First National Bank v. Yankton
County, for example, the Court broadly defined congressional power over the
territories as a “full and complete legislative authority over the people of the
Territories and all the departments of the territorial governments.”254 Following
the reasoning of Dred Scott, however, the Court did not tie this power to the
Property Clause.255 In fact, the Court in United States v. Kagama explicitly disclaimed the Property Clause as a source of power. It stated that, rather than deriving from “the clause in the Constitution in regard to disposing of and making
rules and regulations concerning the Territory and other property of the United
States,” the power to legislate for the territories arises “from the ownership of
the country in which the Territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty
which must exist in the National Government, and can be found nowhere
else.”256
250

Id.
Id. at 435.
252 Id. at 432. Taney, however, did not hold that Congress lacked regulatory authority over
the territories. Instead, he held that Congress’s power over the territories could be implied
from its power to acquire them. Id. at 448.
253 Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article, the Court’s application of
text and framers’ intent is far too rigid. In sum, the framers must have anticipated that the
United States could acquire additional territory, and they certainly knew how to write the
Clause more clearly if they had intended to limit it to specific lands. The argument from intent is also unconvincing because, even though the framers had specific lands in mind at the
time of the Founding, the Constitution they created applies more broadly.
254 First Nat’l Bank v. Yankton Cty., 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1879).
255 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 440.
256 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380 (1886) (citations omitted); see also Murphy
v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885) (“The people of the United States, as sovereign owners of
the National Territories, have supreme power over them and their inhabitants.”); First Nat’l
Bank, 101 U.S. at 133 (referring to Congress’s power over the territories as “an incident of
sovereignty”).
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The Court more fully explained the basis of Congress’s “general and plenary” power over the territories in Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States.257 While upholding Congress’s revocation of the charter of the Mormon Church, the Court explained that, “[h]aving
rightfully acquired said territories, the United States government was the only
one which could impose laws upon them, and its sovereignty over them was
complete. No State of the Union had any such right of sovereignty over them;
no other country or government had any such right.”258 Quoting Justice Marshall in Insurance Company v. Canter, the Court continued to explain that “the
power of governing a Territory belonging to the United States, which has not,
by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result necessarily from the facts, that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State,
and is within the power and jurisdiction of the United States.”259 Congress’s
authority, therefore, was “self-evident” from the lack of any other lawmaking
body.260 Although the Court did not reach the issue of whether Congress retained such a “general and plenary” authority over federal land within a state,
its reasoning would have no application after statehood.261
In fact, the Court’s late eighteenth century Property Clause decisions
demonstrated that the Court continued to believe that Congress had less authority over federal land within a state. In 1885, the Court in Fort Leavenworth
Railroad Company v. Lowe held that the state of Kansas had the power to tax a
railroad operating on the federal military installation of Fort Leavenworth.262
The Court explained that, before Kansas was admitted to the Union, “the United States possessed the rights of a proprietor, and had political dominion and
sovereignty” over the land.263 However, after “Kansas was admitted into the
Union upon an equal footing with the original States,” the United States “retained . . . only the rights of an ordinary proprietor. . . .”264 As a result, the
Court held, “[t]he State could have exercised, with reference to it, the same authority and jurisdiction which she could have exercised over similar property
held by private parties.”265
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Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 42 (1890).
258 Id. at 42–43. The Court began its discussion by stating that Congress’s power over the
territories was “incidental to the right to acquire the Territory itself, and from the power given by the Constitution to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the Territory or
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261 Scholars who have attempted to use precedent regarding the territories to define Congress’s power over land within a state therefore miss the mark.
262 Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 526, 542 (1885).
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The Court further held that, although the tax would have been invalid if
Fort Leavenworth were a federal enclave, the requirements of the Enclave
Clause had not been met.266 Pursuant to the Enclave Clause, Congress has “exclusive” jurisdiction over land obtained with the consent of the state.267 The
Court noted, however, that the federal government had long purchased land
within the states without obtaining such state consent.268 The Court explained:
The consent of the States to the purchase of lands within them for the special
purposes named is, however, essential, under the Constitution, to the transfer to
the general government, with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion.
Where lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of the United
States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary proprietor. The property in that case, unless used as a
means to carry out the purposes of the government, is subject to the legislative
authority and control of the States equally with the property of private individuals.269

It is difficult to square this passage with unlimited regulatory power under the
Property Clause.
This is not to say, however, that the Fort Leavenworth Court held that the
states have absolute power over federal land. Instead, the Court said that federal
land, like all land, would be exempt from state legislation if “essential to the
independence and sovereign authority of the United States within the sphere of
their delegated powers.”270 State law, in other words, would still be preempted
if it conflicted with Congress’s enumerated powers, such as its power over
commerce and the post office.271
As the Court in Fort Leavenworth noted, U.S. Attorney General George H.
Williams reached a similar conclusion in an official opinion in 1872. Williams
wrote that, “while the United States appear to now hold the land[][,] . . . it
would seem that the jurisdiction over the same has passed to the State of Kansas by virtue of the act of June 29, 1861, admitting that State into the Union.”272
He further explained that “[t]he effect of that act was to withdraw from Federal
jurisdiction all the territory within the boundaries of the new State, excepting
only the territories of Indians. . . .”273
In Ward v. Race Horse, the Court took Fort Leavenworth a step further and
held that congressional regulations of activities on federal land were invalid if
they conflicted with state legislation.274 Prior to the admission of Wyoming, the
United States had entered into a treaty that guaranteed hunting rights to the
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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Id. at 531.
Id. at 539.
See Engdahl, supra note 7, at 306.
Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 33, 34 (1872).
Id. (emphasis added).
Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 516 (1896).
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Bannock Indians on unoccupied federal lands within the state.275 Wyoming
sought to regulate hunting on federal land and challenged the treaty by arguing
that the equal footing doctrine made it the “preeminent sovereign” over federal
land within its borders.276 The Court accepted Wyoming’s argument and stated
the following:
The power of all the States to regulate the killing of game within their borders
will not be gainsaid, yet, if the treaty applies to the unoccupied land of the United States in the State of Wyoming, that State would be bereft of such power,
since every isolated piece of land belonging to the United States as a private
owner, so long as it continued to be unoccupied land, would be exempt in this
regard from the authority of the State. Wyoming, then, will have been admitted
into the Union, not as an equal member, but as one shorn of a legislative power
vested in all the other States of the Union, a power resulting from the fact of
statehood and incident to its plenary existence.277

The Court therefore held that Congress implicitly repealed the treaty by
admitting Wyoming as a state because “the [hunting] privilege conferred and
the act of admission [of Wyoming as a state], are irreconcilable in the sense
that the two[,] under no reasonable hypothesis[,] can be construed as coexisting.”278 Because there would have been no conflict between the treaty and the
admission of Wyoming if Congress had the power to preempt state hunting law
on federal land under the Property Clause, the Court must have narrowly interpreted Congress’s property power.
Scholars have rightly criticized Ward for failing to recognize that federal
treaties and Indian law preempt any conflicting state law and should be liberally construed in favor of native tribes.279 In fact, Herrera v. Wyoming, which the
Supreme Court decided just this term, explicitly rejects Race Horse’s argument
that the federal treaty interfered with state sovereignty.280 And yet, scholars are
wrong to therefore conclude that Ward has nothing to say about how the Court
understood the Property Clause in 1896.281 The Court’s decision in Ward shows
that the justices thought Congress had no power to preempt state law regarding
hunting on federal land.282 The fact that the Court erred by holding that the
275
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279 See Wilkins, supra note 275, at 105. In fact, the District Court struck down the Wyoming
law on the grounds that it was preempted by the federal treaty. See id. at 103–04.
280 Herrera v. Wyoming, No. 17-532 8 (U.S. May 20, 2019) (holding that the treaty did not
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regulations on an Indian tribe’s treaty-based hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on state
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was analogous to the treaty at issue in Race Horse. Id. at 17.
281 See Goble, The Myth of the Classic Property Clause Doctrine, supra note 7, at 505 n.44
(arguing that “[t]he decision thus is inapposite because it turns upon the treaty clause . . . .”).
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treaty had been implicitly repealed does not change the Court’s narrow reading
of the Property Clause.
Although the Court held that Congress’s regulatory authority was limited,
the Court also held that the federal government was not an ordinary proprietor.
In Gibson v. Chouteau, the Court held that a state could not authorize a private
party to take equitable title to federal land based on possession.283 The Court
stated:
With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Congress the power
of disposition and of making all needful rules and regulations. That power is
subject to no limitations. Congress has the absolute right to prescribe the times,
the conditions, and the mode of transferring this property, or any part of it, and
to designate the persons to whom the transfer shall be made.284

As a result, the Court held, “[n]o State legislation can interfere with this
right or embarrass its exercise . . . .”285 Taken in context, the Court’s statement
that Congress’s power is “subject to no limitations” refers to Congress’s power
to own and dispose of property. Gibson is therefore fully consistent with limited federal regulatory power.
In 1897, however, the Court took an incremental step towards a broader
view of federal power in Camfield v. United States.286 The defendant in Camfield was charged with violating a statute that made it illegal to enclose federal
land.287 Due to a system of land grants that was common in the West, the defendants owned all of the odd-numbered sections of land in the area in question.288 By building a fence only on their privately-owned odd-numbered lots,
the defendants managed to fence in the federally owned even-numbered lots as
well.289 Because their fences were not physically located on federal land, the
defendants argued that the federal act was unconstitutional as applied to
them.290
The Court upheld the application of the federal act. The Court explained
that “the Government has, with respect to its own lands, the rights of an ordinary proprietor to maintain its possession and to prosecute trespassers. It may
deal with such lands precisely as a private individual may deal with his farming
property. It may sell or withhold them from sale.”291 If the fences had been
built on federal land, the Court therefore stated, the federal government could
have abated the fences without recourse to state officers.292 The Court therefore
took a broad view of Congress’s powers as a proprietor—not only could Con283
284
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gress prohibit trespassing on federal land, but it could directly punish trespassers. Unlike an ordinary landowner, the United States was not required to seek
state assistance to punish a private party that interfered with its property rights.
The Camfield Court applied this broad view of Congress’s proprietor power to police conduct on private land that directly interfered with Congress’s
property rights. The Court held: “we think the fence is clearly a nuisance, and
that it is within the constitutional power of Congress to order its abatement,
notwithstanding such action may involve an entry upon the lands of a private
individual.”293 Confusingly, the Court characterized Congress’s power over
federal lands within a state both as that of an “ordinary proprietor” and as
“analogous to the police power of the several States.”294 The Court, however,
clarified that
the extent to which it may go in the exercise of such power is measured by the
exigencies of the particular case. If it be found to be necessary for the protection
of the public or of intending settlers, to forbid all enclosures of public lands, the
Government may do so . . . .295

The Court continued to explain that it did “not think the admission of a Territory as a State deprives it of the power of legislating for the protection of the public lands, though it may thereby involve the exercise of what is ordinarily
known as the police power, so long as such power is directed solely to its own
protection.”296 At the turn of the twentieth century, therefore, the Court held
that Congress had a power to regulate activities on private land within a state
when the “exigencies of the particular case” made such regulation necessary
“for the protection of the public . . . .”297
Camfield thus held for the first time that Congress could regulate extraterritorially under the Property Clause.298 Congress, in other words, could use the
Property Clause to regulate activities that did not take place on federal land.
The Court’s explicit connection of this power to nuisance law, however, suggests that Congress’s regulatory power was quite narrow. According to the First
Restatement of Torts, a nuisance is a “non-trespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”299 An action in nuisance is thus
293
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not a state-law tort claim like negligence; instead, it is a remedy for an invasion
of a property interest. The Court in Camfield merely held that, when a private
party invades federal property interests, the federal government may directly
abate the nuisance without appealing to the state courts for a remedy.300 This is
hardly an expansive interpretation of congressional power, as private landowners could also abate a nuisance by self-help under certain circumstances under
the common law.301 Moreover, the Court’s holding in Camfield is consistent
with the Court’s longstanding view that federal title is different than private title. Just as the Court held in Gibson that the states cannot divest the U.S. of title
through adverse possession, Camfield held that the federal government may
legislate to protect the U.S.’s property rights from private invasions.302
Later cases confirm that the Court’s opinion in Camfield did not signal a
reversal in the Court’s limited reading of the Property Clause.303 In Butte City
Water Company v. Baker, for example, the defendant challenged Congress’s
delegation to the states of the power to enact regulations regarding mining
rights on federal land.304 Although the law would seem to have violated the
prevailing anti-delegation doctrine,305 the Court upheld the delegation because
Congress’s power under the Property Clause was “not of a legislative character
in the highest sense of the term . . . .”306 The Court reasoned that the Property
Clause granted Congress only the “power to determine the conditions upon
which the public lands shall be disposed of.”307 Because “an owner may delegate to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates, giving to them a
limited discretion, so it would seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to
300
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the local legislature the determination of minor matters respecting the disposal
of these lands.”308 In other words, Congress’s delegation was constitutional because it could only delegate a limited power to dispose of the federal land. Although the Court began expanding federal power in Camfield, the Court in
Baker stressed that federal power was still limited.
In 1917, the Court in Utah Power & Light Company v. United States stated
that although Congress had the legislative power to protect federal lands, as the
Court had found in Camfield, and determine property rights therein, as the
Court had stated in Gibson, the state otherwise had jurisdiction over federal
lands, as the Court had held in Ward.309 The defendant in Utah Power argued
that, because federal land within a state could be regulated by the state in the
same manner as any privately held land, it was entitled to a right of way on unoccupied federal land based on state law.310 In rejecting this contention, the
Court explained:
True, for many purposes a State has civil and criminal jurisdiction over lands
within its limits belonging to the United States, but this jurisdiction does not extend to any matter that is not consistent with full power in the United States to
protect its lands, to control their use and to prescribe in what manner others may
acquire rights in them. Thus while the State may punish public offenses, such as
murder or larceny, committed on such lands, and may tax private property, such
as live stock, located thereon, it may not tax the lands themselves or invest others with any right whatever in them. 311

In other words, Congress could not be divested of its property rights by
state law. As the Court explained in Light v. United States, “[t]he United States
can prohibit absolutely or fix the terms on which its property may be used.”312
When property rights were not at issue, however, state law would prevail.313
C. The New Deal to Today
In the New Deal Era, however, the Court abruptly changed course and expansively interpreted Congress’s power over federal land within a state. In
1940, the Court in United States v. City and County of San Francisco broadly
stated that “[t]he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered. That is for Congress to determine.”314 The Court therefore upheld conditions imposed by Congress on a grant of federal land to San Francisco that
prohibited the City from allowing a private company to use the land for the
purpose of selling water or electricity.315 The Court explained that Congress’s
308
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conditions did “not represent an exercise of a general control over public policy
in a State but instead only an exercise of the complete power which Congress
has over particular public property entrusted to it.”316 The Court thus broadly
declared that Congress’s power over federal lands was “complete,” “without
limitations,” and could be used to achieve Congress’s “views of public policy.”317 Soon after the New Deal Court began deferring to Congress in its
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Court stated that “it is not for the courts to
say how that trust [the power entrusted to Congress under the Property Clause]
shall be administered.”318
The Court cemented its expansive interpretation of congressional power in
the seminal case of Kleppe v. New Mexico.319 This case involved a challenge to
the constitutionality of the federal Wild Free-roaming Horses and Burros Act,
which protected wild horses and burros on federal land.320 A rancher complained to state authorities that wild burros were eating his feed and harassing
his livestock that were legally grazing on federal land.321 The state authorities
rounded up the burros on federal land and sold them at public auction pursuant
to the New Mexico Estray Law.322 After the sale, the federal Bureau of Land
Management demanded that the state recover the animals.323 New Mexico then
filed suit seeking a declaratory judgement that the Wild Free-roaming Horses
and Burros Act was unconstitutional.324
The Kleppe Court held that “the Property Clause . . . gives Congress the
power to protect wildlife on the public lands, state law notwithstanding.”325 In
doing so, the Court rejected the state’s argument that the Property Clause
granted Congress only: “(1) the power to dispose of and make incidental rules
regarding the use of federal property; and (2) the power to protect federal property.”326 Instead, the Court held, “Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a legislature over the public domain,” and its power over federal
property is “without limitation[].”327 Congress had found that wild burros were
“an integral part of the natural system of the public lands,” and the Court did
not question this conclusion because “determinations under the Property Clause
are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress.”328 Kleppe’s broad interpretation of the Property Clause remains good law today.
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In California Coastal Commission v. Granite Rock, the Court held that
while Congress’s power over federal land is unlimited, it is not exclusive.329
The plaintiff in Granite Rock challenged a California law that required it to obtain a permit before mining on federal land under the federal Mining Act.330
The Court held that “ ‘the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on
federal land so long as those laws do not conflict with federal law.”331 The
Court thus announced that Congress’s “plenary power” over the federal lands
was not exclusive, but that any state regulation of activities on federal land
would be subject to ordinary preemption analysis.332
IV. STRUCTURE: THE PROPERTY CLAUSE AND FEDERALISM
A. New Federalism
Kleppe’s expansive interpretation of congressional power over the public
domain is inconsistent with the Court’s modern federalism jurisprudence. Using “a form of structural inference,” the Court in these cases has developed
“implied limitations in federal power that are traceable to some form of historically reconstructed original understanding of the appropriate federal-state balance.”333 In these cases, the Court has sought to limit the potentially unbounded
power granted to Congress during the New Deal.334
The Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence provides an apt analogy. In
the decades leading up to the New Deal, the Court narrowly defined commerce
and did not allow Congress to intrude on a zone of activities reserved to the
states.335 In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court struck down a regulation of goods produced by child labor because, “[t]he power of the States to
regulate their purely internal affairs by such laws as seem wise to the local authority is inherent and has never been surrendered to the general government.”336 After 1936, however, the Supreme Court changed course and upheld
329
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the New Deal’s vast expansion of federal power.337 While upholding the Fair
Labor Standards Act in United Stated v. Darby, for example, the Court stated
that “[t]he power of Congress over interstate commerce ‘is complete in itself,
may be exercised to its utmost extent,’ ” and “can neither be enlarged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state power.”338 In cases like Wickard v. Filburn, the Court further held that the Commerce Clause empowered
Congress to regulate purely local activities so long as such activities, in the aggregate, have a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.339 Because
virtually everything has an economic effect, the New Deal interpretation of the
Commerce Clause effectively gave Congress an unlimited police power over
the nation.340 The New Deal Court’s expansive view of federal commerce power mirrors Kleppe’s unlimited Property Clause.
Starting with United States v. Lopez in 1995, however, the Court has imposed significant limitations on Congress’s commerce power.341 The Court in
United States v. Lopez rejected the idea that Congress could regulate any activity that had an economic effect.342 Instead, the Court held that Congress could
use the Commerce Clause to regulate only activities that were themselves economic in nature.343 The Court then applied this doctrinal limitation to strike
down the Gun-Free School Zones Act after finding that the mere possession of
a handgun is a noneconomic activity.344 In United States v. Morrison, the Court
similarly struck down the Violence Against Women Act after finding that gender-motivated violence is not economic activity, notwithstanding the uncontested fact that such violence substantially affects the interstate economy.345
The Court further limited Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius by holding that Congress
can only regulate preexisting commercial activity and cannot “create” commerce.346
The Court explicitly tied these doctrinal limitations to federalism concerns.347 The Court in Lopez, for example, warned that a broad interpretation of
the commerce power would eliminate any “limitation on federal power, even in
areas . . . where States historically have been sovereign.”348 And, in N.F.I.B.,
337
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the Court rejected a broad interpretation of Congress’s powers that “would carry us from the notion of a government of limited powers.”349 As the Court stated in both cases, “we should ‘pause to consider the implications’ . . . when confronted with such new conceptions of federal power.”350 Indeed, Justice
Roberts stated in N.F.I.B. that even the Necessary and Proper Clause could not
save those laws “that undermine the structure of government established by the
Constitution.”351
Like with the Commerce Clause, Congress could use a broad reading of its
power under the Property Clause to eviscerate federalism. At its core, federalism is a system of government that empowers the states to disagree with federal
decisions on important matters of policy.352 Constitutional protections for federalism are thus meaningful only if they preserve some measure of state independence on public policy. As illustrated in this Article’s introduction, however, the Court’s reading of the Property Clause would empower the federal
government to effectively overrule state law on important policy matters that
are traditionally left to the states. On many important issues that have become
cultural flashpoints, such as abortion, immigrant detention, physician-assisted
suicide, gambling, and drug use, a broad reading of the Property Clause would
allow Congress to frustrate state policy. For example, Congress could authorize
the construction of abortion clinics, casinos, marijuana dispensaries, or hospice
centers that practice assisted suicide on federal land. Such a power would be
especially significant given the fact that Congress can purchase or take additional land under its eminent domain power. The Court’s broad interpretation of
the Property Clause therefore has the potential to undermine the Court’s federalism revolution by empowering Congress to overrule important state policy.
As the Court stated in Morrison, “[u]nder our written Constitution, . . . the limitation of congressional authority is not solely a matter of legislative grace.”353
The Court’s broad interpretation of the Property Clause is even more problematic when applied beyond the metes and bounds of federal land.354 The
Court’s holding in Camfield—that Congress can abate a nuisance on privately
owned land that interferes with the use and enjoyment of federal land—seems
unobjectionable. A sufficiently broad interpretation of the Property Clause,
however, would essentially create an unlimited federal police power. Because
natural ecosystems are highly interconnected, virtually any land use or activity
that causes pollution could substantially affect federal land.355 Moreover, most
349
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economic conduct, such as factory production, the disposal of products or
waste in landfills, or even the use of electricity, has some attenuated effect on
federal land. A sufficiently broad interpretation of Congress’s power under the
Property Clause thus “would erode those limits, permitting Congress to reach
beyond the natural extent of its authority, ‘everywhere extending the sphere of
its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex.’ ”356 In sum, a
broad reading of the Property Clause could erase Lopez, Morrison, and Sebelius
by conferring on Congress the same type of unlimited federal police power that
those cases rejected.
B. Equal Sovereignty
The Supreme Court’s Property Clause doctrine is also at odds with its recent recognition of the equal sovereignty doctrine. In Shelby County v. Holder,
the Court applied this doctrine to strike down a portion of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (VRA).357 This legislation addresses the widespread problem of
voter suppression. Although the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, racial discrimination virtually rendered the amendment a nullity for nearly a century.358 In the rare instances where the courts struck down state policies, the
states simply followed different discriminatory strategies “through unremitting
and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”359 This racial discrimination was
especially pronounced in the deep South, where white voter registration rates
were more than fifty percent higher than those of African Americans.360
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to address these problems
and fulfill the promise of the Fifteenth Amendment.361 Section 2 of the VRA
prohibits any “prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure” that
“results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color.”362 Based on the history of southern defiance, however, Congress understood that the South might annul the effect of
Section 2 by constantly changing their discriminatory tactics. Section 5 of the
VRA therefore requires a three-judge federal district court in Washington or the
Attorney General of the United States to approve any change in the election
laws of selected jurisdictions that had a history of blatant racial discrimination.363
356
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Section 4(b) of the VRA selects jurisdictions for this preclearance system.364 It originally applied to each state or subdivision that used any “test or
device” to determine voting eligibility and had less than fifty percent of the eligible population cast a ballot in 1964.365 Congress later updated the formula to
include any jurisdiction that failed to meet this test in 1968 or 1972.366 When
Congress reauthorized the VRA in 1982 and 2006, however, it did not update
the coverage formula.367 Instead, the VRA allowed covered jurisdictions to
“bail out” of coverage by showing a lack of recent discrimination.368 When
Shelby County was decided by the Court in 2013, therefore, Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia
were subject to preclearance based on data that had not been updated in decades.369
The Court in Shelby County struck down the application of Section 4(b)’s
preclearance formula. The Court held that the preclearance system violated the
“ ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”370 Chief Justice Roberts explained that the VRA “sharply departs” from the principle of
equal sovereignty because the “States must beseech the Federal Government
for permission to implement laws that they would otherwise have the right to
enact and execute on their own.”371 Because the VRA violates the doctrine of
equal state sovereignty, the Court held, the VRA’s differential treatment “must
be ‘sufficiently related to the problem’ ” of voting discrimination.372 The Court
ultimately concluded that application of the preclearance formula was unconstitutional because it could not even survive rational basis review.373 Because the
formula relied solely on conditions from the 1960s and 70s, the Court held, the
VRA’s limitation of the sovereignty of the covered states did not “make[] sense
in light of current conditions.”374
Scholars have almost universally criticized Shelby County’s equal sovereignty doctrine and especially its application to legislation passed under the
Reconstruction Amendments.375 However, as documented here and more fully
explored elsewhere,376 scholars are wrong to suggest that the equal sovereignty
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doctrine lacks historical support.377 Scholarly claims that the Court in Shelby
County “invented” equal sovereignty are tenable only by myopically focusing
on Supreme Court precedent on the equal footing doctrine.378 And yet, it is fair
to take the Court to task for applying the equal sovereignty doctrine to limit
Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments while giving
Congress an unlimited legislative power over nearly one-third of the country,
most of which is located within a small number of Western states. As demonstrated above, equal sovereignty arguments originated in debates over the public lands and were rebuffed by congressmen who disclaimed any federal regulatory power over U.S. lands within the states. It is therefore anomalous for the
Court to recognize the equal sovereignty principle while maintaining that Congress has unlimited regulatory power under the Property Clause.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. The Property Clause and Environmental Law
This Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause is defensible from the
standpoint of practical policy concerns. In sum, limiting the Property Clause
would change the status quo only in the rare instances where the Commerce
Clause does not justify a federal regulation. When the Property Clause is the
sole basis of federal authority, this Article’s approach would require all land
uses to be consistent with both federal and state policy. States like California
would therefore have a newfound power to prevent environmental degradation

377
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on federal land within their borders.379 Because the states lack the power to
seize federal land through eminent domain,380 however, state power would be
asymmetrical. Although the states could veto environmentally harmful activities on federal land, they would otherwise be unable to override federal policy.
Just like any other landowner, the federal government would still retain the
power to exclude polluters or companies that seek to extract resources, even
over state objections. This asymmetry may be desirable because, as the current
crisis over climate change demonstrates, we often have incentives to overdevelop at the expense of the long-term public good.381
When the first major environmental statutes were passed during the 1970s,
the Commerce Clause appeared to provide a solid foundation.382 Clean air,
clean water, and even biodiversity all have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce, at least in the aggregate. Since the Court limited the reach of the
Commerce Clause to economic activity in Lopez, however, there has been considerable academic debate over whether these laws remain fully justified.383
Environmental legislation is often not commercial in nature and sometimes
regulates activities that appear to be no more economic than the conduct at issue in Lopez or Morrison.
This is especially true for the Clean Water Act (discussed in this Article’s
introduction) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).384 The purpose of the
ESA is to protect endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems that
they rely upon.385 The ESA achieves this goal by, among other things, protecting the species and their habitats from federal action and prohibiting anyone
from “taking” protected animals.386 The “taking” provision has been broadly
interpreted to include not only directly harming a protected animal, but also
modifying its habitat in a way that causes such harm.387
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Although the lower courts continue to uphold the ESA,388 its constitutionality under the Commerce Clause is far from clear in every application. The
habitats of roughly half of the endangered or threatened species covered under
the act are located within a single state, and most of the animals have little or
no commercial value.389 It would therefore be possible for a court to conclude
that the protection of endangered species is no more economic than the gendermotivated violence or gun possession that was struck down in Morrison and
Lopez. In fact, several lower court judges who have directly confronted the issue have suggested that some applications of the ESA would be unconstitutional.390
In Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, for example, a real estate developer’s
plan for a massive housing development threatened the existence of the arroyo
southwestern toad.391 The toad has no commercial value, the threatened habitat
was located solely within California, and the toad rarely travels more than a
mile from its habitat.392 The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld the application of
the ESA to block the developer’s plan, but Chief Judge Ginsburg wrote separately to stress her view that, “with respect to a species that is not an article in
interstate commerce and does not affect interstate commerce, a take can be regulated if—but only if—the take itself substantially affects interstate commerce.”393 Ginsburg joined the court’s opinion only because the regulated activity was “large-scale residential development.”394 However, she stated, “the
lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who moves dirt in order to landscape his property, though he takes the toad, does not affect interstate commerce.”395 It is possible that the same could be said for other private takings by
outdoor enthusiasts without a commercial motive, such as the recreational fisherman, hunter, or camper.
Although there are thus plausible arguments against the constitutionality of
some applications of the ESA, this Article takes no position on their validity.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. Raich potentially supports the
constitutionality of the ESA in whole.396 The Court in Raich upheld the application of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to the intrastate home-growth
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and use of medical marijuana in California.397 The Court in Raich reasoned that
enforcement against medical marijuana was constitutional because it was a
necessary part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme (the CSA) that was justified under the Commerce Clause.398 Although a full discussion is beyond the
scope of this Article, similar logic potentially could be used for the ESA.399
Even if federal environmental legislation like the ESA is sound under the
current doctrine, it is always possible that the Supreme Court will further narrow the Commerce Clause. In fact, with Justice Kennedy’s retirement and the
appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, such a move would not be completely unexpected. The federalism revolution of the last few decades has been a product
of the right, and studies consistently show that Kavanaugh is to the right of
Kennedy on most issues.400 In fact, prominent conservative academics have
called for the new Court to further limit federal power, including in the sphere
of the Commerce Clause and environmental law.401
If the Supreme Court were to hold that the Commerce Clause cannot justify
the application of a federal environmental law, the Property Clause is another
potential source of authority. In fact, several scholars argue that the Property
Clause currently removes any constitutional doubt regarding federal power
over the environment.402 Some scholars even contend that the Property Clause
justifies federal regulation of anything that, in the aggregate, could have an effect on federal land.403
Under this Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause, even where the
Commerce Clause does not apply, Congress would still have the power to enact
environmental regulations protecting federal land. As the Court held in preNew Deal cases like Camfield, Congress can exclude people, corporations, and
specific activities from its lands just like any other landowner.404 In fact, because the power to regulate is typically used to limit or prohibit, Congress’s
power as a proprietor would not be dramatically different from a sovereign
power to regulate. Just as a proprietor can deny permission to a company that
seeks to conduct fracking or drill for oil on her privately owned land, Congress
could use its proprietary powers to prohibit such activities on U.S. lands.
The key distinction between regulatory and proprietary power is whether
Congress has the ability to preempt state legislation. Pursuant to the Supremacy
397
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Clause, federal regulations preempt any conflicting state legislation.405 An ordinary proprietor, however, lacks the power to overrule valid state law. Acting
only as a proprietor of federal land, Congress would thus lack the power to authorize the destruction of the habitat of a threatened species or the pollution of
an intrastate wetland if prohibited by state law. Limiting the Property Clause
would thus preserve federal authority while also empowering the states to provide a check on federal standards.406
While this Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause would give the
states the power to protect the environment from federally authorized activities,
it would not allow states to undermine federal protections for U.S. land. This is
true because of the nature of federal title. Unlike an ordinary landowner, Congress has always had an unlimited power to retain and dispose of federal land
without any interference from the states.407 Even under a limited interpretation
of the Property Clause, the states thus could not take federal land, authorize
private parties to interfere with federal land rights, or assess property taxes on
the United States. Unlike with a private landowner, therefore, the states cannot
overrule federal land use restrictions by interfering with federal property rights.
For example, a state cannot use its eminent domain power to seize federal lands
for development. As a result, limiting the Property Clause would not empower
the states to roll back environmental protections for federal lands.
Providing the states and federal government with overlapping power would
therefore structurally favor conservation over development. Our federally dominated system has worked reasonably well only because the federal government
has aggressively sought to protect the environment since the 1970s.408 Even
when the executive has been less inclined towards environmental protection,
such as during the Trump administration,409 Congress has not dramatically
changed the law. The Courts thus often block executive action that exceeds
statutory authorization.410 But suppose that Congress scrapped environmental
legislation and declared open season for pollution, development, and resource
extraction. Under modern doctrine, the states would be powerless to stop the
resulting environmental harm. Modern environmental federalism is thus not in405
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herently disposed to environmental protection; instead, it has served environmental interests only because the federal government has been disposed to do
so up to this point.
Indeed, “environmental federalism” is a misnomer.411 Because the states
have no more independence than the federal government allows, there is no actual split of sovereign authority.412 Although federal law usually permits the
states to strengthen environmental protections,413 Congress always retains the
power to overrule state law. Federal policy—good or bad—can therefore potentially always control. By preserving state sovereignty, a limited reading of the
Property Clause would empower states to veto destructive federal policy.
B. Other Issues: Federal Land Ownership, Tribal Sovereignty, and Other
Social Issues
Several legal scholars contend that, under the original meaning of the
Property Clause, Congress not only has a “power to dispose of” federal land,
but it also has a duty to do so.414 Such scholarship provides the academic foundation for legislation such as Utah’s Transfer of Public Lands Act, which demands that the federal government transfer title to more than twenty-million
acres of land to the state.415 Although such state legislation is preempted by
federal law, the Republican platform and many national party leaders have endorsed transferring at least some significant portion of federal land to the
states.416
This Article’s proposed limitation of the Property Clause, however, would
have no effect on federal land ownership. As I have argued elsewhere at length,
federal land ownership is fully consistent with constitutional history.417 When
the meaning of the Property Clause was first debated in Congress, the leading
statesmen of the day argued that unqualified federal land ownership was constitutional because it did not carry a national police power into the territory of the
states. Returning to the original understanding of the Property Clause thus
would not support state demands for federal land. By the same logic, however,
it also would not save California’s recent attempt to limit the federal govern-

411
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ment’s power to sell land to private parties.418 Congress’s power to retain or
sell the federal lands would remain unlimited.
This Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause would also have no effect on federal Indian law. The Court has long held that the tribes are “ ‘domestic dependent nations,’ subject to plenary control by Congress.”419 In U.S. v.
Lara, the Court stated that Congress’s “broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes” derive from a combination of the Indian Commerce
Clause, the treaty power, and inherent military and foreign affairs powers that
are “necessary concomitants of nationality.”420 Notwithstanding the obvious
connections,421 the Property Clause is thus not a basis of federal power over the
Indian tribes. A limited reading of the Property Clause would therefore not empower the states to interfere with federal Indian law.
This Article’s interpretation, however, would prevent Congress from abusing its Property Clause power by overruling the states on a range of other social
issues. As discussed in the Introduction, the Court’s current interpretation of
the Property Clause empowers Congress to unilaterally seize land within a state
and place it beyond the state’s control. Although the Property Clause is often
associated with environmental law, there is nothing in the doctrine to stop Congress from using the Clause to create havens where people are exempt from
state law. Congress therefore could effectively overrule state policies on issues
such as the treatment of detained migrant children, abortion, gambling, or physician-assisted suicide. Under the original understanding of the Constitution,
Congress must obtain the consent of the states under the Enclave Clause before
obtaining such power. This Article’s interpretation of the Property Clause
would thus preserve state sovereignty over internal affairs.
State sovereignty, of course, is not an unmitigated good. Most Americans
(including the author) believe that empowering the states to outlaw abortion
would constitute bad policy.422 States’ rights ideology also was used to justify
the evils of slavery, secession, and Jim Crow.423 And yet, federalism has also
been used to justify antislavery opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act and state
sanctuary policies that seek to ameliorate some of the harsh consequences of
418
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federal immigration enforcement.424 In sum, federalism is a system of government that empowers a local majority to pass laws that are at odds with federal
policy. The normative desirability of federalism depends on who is in power in
the federal government.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should overrule its broad interpretation of Congress’s
power under the Property Clause. A deep dive into constitutional history shows
that, when the nation first grappled with the issue in the early nineteenth century, the leading statesmen of the day all rejected an expansive interpretation of
federal power over the public lands. Federal landownership was consistent with
a republic of equal states, they argued, only because it did not displace the primacy of state sovereignty over most issues. When the Supreme Court’s early
precedent—including the infamous Dred Scott decision—are read in context,
they reveal that the Court shared this understanding of the Property Clause.
Although federal land ownership is fully consistent with constitutional history,
the modern doctrine otherwise has no historical support prior to the New Deal
era.
The Court’s interpretation of the Property Clause is also inconsistent with
modern constitutional law. Over the past several decades, the Court has limited
federal power, most notably under the Commerce Clause, to preserve a sphere
of autonomy for the states. A broad interpretation of the Property Clause, however, could easily allow Congress to bypass such limitations and undermine
state policy. The Court’s Property Clause doctrine is especially inconsistent
with the Court’s recent recognition of the equal state sovereignty principle,
which first emerged during the debates over the public lands.
Advocates of environmental regulation should not reject this Article’s approach to Congress’s Property Power out of hand. Congress could continue to
regulate activities on federal land as a landowner. This Article’s interpretation
of the Property Clause would simply empower the states to act as an additional
check. Because the states cannot interfere with federal title, they could not seize
federal land and authorize new land uses over federal objections. The Article’s
approach would thus structurally favor conservation over development. On other matters, the normative desirability of empowering the states would depend
on who is in office.
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